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Abstract
In this thesis I will examine St. Thomas Aquinas’s treatment o f human nature and 
connect my findings with his conception o f the ultimate end o f human existence. As a 
theologian St. Thomas held the position that man’s ultimate goal is happiness or 
beatitudo -  which consists in the vision o f God. Thomas explores the resources that 
are to be found in human nature and in particular those that are needed in order to 
achieve happiness to some degree in this life, and then considers the infinite happiness 
that is to be found in God alone.
I show how St. Thomas’s solution to the mind-body problem is relevant today, albeit 
in a world which measures success in terms o f power and wealth but yet longs for 
what today we might term a spiritual dimension to our lives. The underlying principle 
for St. Thomas is that the rational soul is the unique form of the body, that is, that the 
soul actualises the body. Body and soul form a composite, a unity o f matter and form. 
In exploring the powers of the soul and St. Thomas’s explanation for the soul’s 
immortality I examine some of the interpretations made by contemporary Thomist 
scholars.
St. Thomas emphasises the autonomy of the person, the capacity to reason and to 
make choices. In order to explore St. Thomas’s ethics I will consider intellect and will 
which are, for him, the two great powers of the soul and show that although distinct 
they are not separable. St. Thomas believes that we can and do act with real freedom, 
otherwise we cannot speak meaningfully about responsibility and in addition the 
application of reward and punishment would be futile.
The second part o f my thesis is a discussion of St. Thomas’s treatise on happiness, 
highlighting his conviction that human beings are not free in one respect -  that is in 
their desire for the certainty o f eternal life or beatitudo. According to St. Thomas 
human beings always act according to what we believe to be the ‘good’ but being 
human also means that we can be very much mistaken in our judgements and 
decisions.
Finally I aim to show that St. Thomas’s overall achievement was to produce a 
synthesis of Christian philosophy with the natural philosophy o f Aristotle. Also, by 
drawing on elements from Jewish and Islamic thought, St. Thomas proves that it is 
possible for us in the twenty first century to move forward and to explore every 
avenue to find a common ground between the various disciplines o f science, 
philosophy and theology. All have the common goal of seeking to understand and 
explore human nature and human destiny.
Abbreviations
InDA Sentencia libri De anima (Leonine vol. 45, 1)
QDM Quaestiones disputatae de malo (Leonine vol. 23)
QDV Quaestiones disputatae de verdate (Leonine vol. 22)
SENT In quatuor libros Sententiarum
ST Summa Theologiae
( la  = first part: lallae = first part o f the second part)
Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature
Background -Life and Times
Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) is considered one o f the great thinkers o f the later
Middle Ages, a time which was marked by major changes in intellectual thought that
challenged the Church’s authority not only in theology but also in philosophy. He was
bom into a society in which the social standing of your family determined the course
of one’s life. Accordingly as the son o f a prominent noble family -  the counts Aquino,
Thomas received his early education at the Benedictine Abbey of Monte Cassino,
followed by an education in the liberal arts at the University o f Naples where he
became acquainted with the order o f friars known as the Dominicans. Much against
the wishes of his family Thomas joined the order “sometime between 1242 and
1244”.1 This was a period that enjoyed a revival o f interest in academic work -  a
rebirth of Europe due to improvements in climate, agricultural methods, food supplies
and a growth in trade. Intellectually a great philosophical system, the works o f
Aristotle became available in the West and were now being studied and interpreted in
the light of western theology -  heavily influenced by Neoplatonism. Thomas was “at
the receptive age of intellectual adolescence”2 when the works of Aristotle were
introduced to the universities in Europe; in July 1239 he started to attend the recently
founded university in Naples (where he first became interested in the new Dominican
Order), after a short interval (during which time his family tried in vain to steer him
away from his Dominican associations), Thomas was sent to the University of Paris
1 Davies, B. (ed.) Thomas Aquinas -  Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002. p. 6.
2Knowles, D. “The Historical Context o f the Philosophical Work o f  St Thomas Aquinas” in Kenny, A. 
(ed.) Aquinas - A  Collection o f  Critical Essays. London -  Melbourne: Macmillan and Co Ltd, 1969. p. 
15.
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from 1245-1248 to study theology under Albert the Great who had a great interest in 
Aristotle. Subsequently he moved to Cologne with Albert to the Dominican studium 
generate. By 1252 he was back studying in Paris and in 1256 he became a master of 
theology. Aristotle was now taught in full at the University o f Paris -  his thought was 
made available to the western world via the Latin translations o f his works and 
through the writings o f the Arabic philosophers, Avicenna and Averroes and the 
Jewish philosopher Maimonides. Thomas also had the advantage of new and accurate 
translations made by his fellow Dominican, William of Moerbeke (1215-1285). The 
availability o f the Latin translations with their new terminology caused confusion and 
some resentment on the one hand among the theologians o f the old school; on the 
other hand it provided Thomas and others with an enthusiasm and stimulus to 
incorporate the new way o f thinking into Christian doctrines. Aristotle’s works 
offered philosophical arguments and principles from which the theologian could 
draw. For example Thomas’s famous proofs for the existence of God draw upon 
principles o f Greek natural philosophy rather than presupposing his theological 
beliefs. Thomas’s thinking was first and foremost theistic3 but under the influence of 
his teacher Albert the Great he began what was to become his lifetime’s work of 
integrating philosophy and theology into a single system. Thomas separated them 
only in regard to how each arrived at truth -  faith is based on Revelation whose truth 
is based on reasoned faith, the philosopher on the other hand reasons from experience 
and comes to understanding of higher things but both have the common goal of 
searching for the truth. Thomas wanted to re-enforce this unity by creating a balance 
between the natural world o f Aristotle and the supernatural world of faith and yet 
remain loyal to his belief in the role of God in all of nature.
3 Davies, p. 8.
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My thesis will attempt to show that Thomas’s philosophical arguments regarding the 
soul are as relevant today in the twenty-first century as they were in the centuries up 
to the end of the Middle Ages and beyond. Thomas’s account considers the physical, 
speculative and spiritual nature of man, focusing on the truth and goodness that can 
belong to each and every human being. Contemporary philosophy has much to learn 
from Thomas’s account o f the uniqueness o f person and from his conviction that there 
is an order and purpose to our lives that guides us in our search for fulfilment and 
happiness. In order to consider each o f these aspects I will first discuss Thomas’s 
treatment o f the unity o f body and soul and his philosophical argument for the soul’s 
immortality; secondly I will investigate his philosophy of mind and show that first 
and foremost it is through experience gained from the senses that the intellect comes 
to know anything. In the course of his discussion on intellect and will we witness 
Thomas’s confirmed belief in the spirit and goodness o f human nature which I will 
discuss with reference to the theory that man’s ultimate desire is for happiness, in so 
far as this may be possible in this life and for beatitude in the next. I will be referring 
to two texts o f the Summa Theologiae, from the first part (la) entitled “Man” 
containing questions 75-83, and from the first part o f the second part (la2ae) entitled 
“Purpose and Happiness” containing questions 1-5; references cite the part, question 
and article and, where applicable, the objections, the corpus, sed contra or responsio 
of the article. These topics will be discussed with the aid o f various commentaries and 
interpretations and, when it may be relevant, I will refer to other parts of the Summa 
Theologiae in order to clarify Thomas’s point of view. To begin I will give a brief 
account o f the sources used by Thomas and o f the main influences on his writing.
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Sources
In his writings on human nature Thomas owes much to his predecessors and 
contemporaries and refers to them throughout his works. Thomas’s works follow the 
Scholastic method that flourished in this period -  the thirteenth century being 
regarded as the high point of Scholasticism, a particular way o f systematising 
theological doctrines and beliefs. One o f the greatest figures in this regard is St. 
Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) who laid the ground for his successors -  his 
famous phrase fides quaerens intellectum established the priority o f faith over reason 
but also the continuity between the two. Following the Scholastic tradition Thomas 
distinguishes different degrees of authority among the authors cited -  the highest 
source is the Word of God expressed in the Gospels; at the next level are the teachings 
of the Church Fathers such as St Augustine, Gregory the Great, and Dionysius the 
Areopagite; next in the hierarchical order are the “ancients” -  the Platonists and the 
Stoics for example and following these Thomas enters into discussion with such 
authorities as Albert and Bonaventure. The chief philosophical source on human 
nature for Thomas is Aristotle, in particular the De Anima, while for his treatise on 
happiness Thomas explores Boethius’s De consolatione. Finally the arguments o f the 
Islamic and Jewish commentators provoke much debate -  for Thomas they were 
“both adversaries and collaborators in researching the truth about God and the human
„ 4person.
In order to examine the various influences on Thomas’s writing it might be helpful to 
select a key area for discussion e.g., the first question of the Treatise on human nature 
enters into the great debate that looks at the two sides of man -  “body” and “soul” .
4 Pope, S. (ed.) The Ethics o f  Aquinas. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002. p. 20.
4
Thomas’s position is clear -  that a human soul without a body is not a human person, 
that body and soul form a composite. To appreciate the arguments and conclusions 
put forward by Thomas we must first take a brief look at the various theories on the 
soul that were available to him and to bear in mind the difficulties he faced in writing 
a treatise that from the beginning to the end emphasises a natural unity o f body and 
soul.
Influences
The Christian thinking of St Augustine dominated most of the Middle Ages until the 
rise o f Aristotelianism and, while Augustine is a considerable influence on Thomas’s 
theology, they stand apart in their understandings o f the soul, in the importance o f the 
body in the constitution o f human nature and in their respective theories of 
knowledge. Following the Neoplatonic principle that the lower exists for the higher 
Augustine’s theory of the soul is characterised by the definition o f man as a soul 
making use of a body (anima utens corpore). Soul is something that does not occupy 
space, an unextended substance that comprises powers o f the soul -  memory, 
understanding and will, which taken together are regarded as an image o f the three 
Persons in the one God. In the same vein he follows the Platonic view of the human 
soul as a “substance partaking of reason adapted to ruling a body.”5 The self is 
identified with the rational soul (ego animus) in Confessions (X.9.6) -  (Augustine is 
following Plotinus here -  Enneads 1.1.3 who in turn is following Plato -  Alcibiades, 
129E) -  emphasising that the “the values o f the soul must be pursued over and above 
the distractions o f the body.”6 Although Augustine ranks among the most quoted and
5 Fitzgerald, A.D. (ed.) Augustine through the Ages -  An Encyclopedia. Michigan -  Cambridge: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999. p. 809.
6 Dunne, M. Divine Illumination in Augustine’s Theory o f Knowledge. Medieval Philosophy Course 
2001-2002. Faculty o f Philosophy, Maynooth. p. 13.
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appreciated of all o f Thomas’s authorities he seeks to reformulate the doctrine of a
• 7soul using a body to be more in accord with the doctrine o f the Incarnation rather 
than its connection to “angelism”.
His teacher St. Albert was one o f the first to promote the benefit of studying the 
philosophical works of Aristotle with the commentaries of Avicenna and Averroes. 
St. Albert was admired by his students for his encyclopaedic mind that he used to give 
“a more or less complete presentation o f all o f the views then known regarding the 
soul as the animating principal o f the body.”8 His view is that the soul is the 
perfection o f the body and that the soul has intellectual powers that do not depend on 
a bodily organ. Albert stresses the importance of soul, he accepts Augustine’s theory 
of soul using a body, but rather than saying that soul is in the body Albert’s view is to 
say that the body is in the soul -  that the body participates in the existence o f the soul. 
He derives his theory of soul from a consideration o f the soul’s essence apart from its 
faculties. Albert attempts to explain the composite o f mind and body by reconciling 
the views o f Avicenna and Aristotle. The Aristotelian doctrine o f the soul as the act of 
the body is combined with the theory that soul, as a perfection o f the body, is capable 
of existing apart from the body in the same way as “a sailor can exist without a ship.”9 
But it fails to give an adequate explanation of soul and body as forming a real unity -  
this is what Thomas hopes to develop.
Bonaventure derives his understanding o f soul from scripture -  union with God is the 
goal o f the human soul and in line with his contemporaries Bonaventure holds that the
7 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. Vol.XI. Introduction and notes by Timothy Suttor. Blackfriars, 
Cambridge: Eyre and Spottiswoode Limited, 1968. p. 19. (note c).
8 Dunne, M. Three Thirteenth century authors on the soul. p. 7.
9 Ibid., p. 8.
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soul is immortal -  as a substance in its own right the rational soul is a hoc aliquid. 
The soul’s immortality gives it power to act upon the body, as such the soul is both 
the “perfectio et motor corporis”. As a composite it is not a perfect substance, its 
receptivity to thoughts, desires, emotions is explained in terms of spiritual matter. 
This is the theory known as universal hylomorphism; that “just as bodily things are 
made o f matter and form, so spiritual substances are made up of form and a spiritual 
matter.”10 Bonaventure holds that the human soul desires to be united to a body and in 
turn the body desires to act as a companion to the soul.
The main source of Thomas’s doctrine o f the soul -  “according to which the soul and
the body constitute a single substance -  standing to each other in the relation o f form
to matter”11 is to be found in Aristotle’s De Anima (On the Soul). Aristotle defines the
12soul as the first actuality of an organic physical body , as that “which confers a 
structure or ordering in terms o f an end and makes something to be a living 
thing.”13Aristotle’s notion of soul however, had left the way open to interpreting his
view o f the soul as something material.
Although there was general agreement among medieval scholars on many basic issues 
-  that human beings have a soul -  that they are composites o f soul and body -  that the 
soul is immaterial and created by God -  that it is immortal -  problems arose when 
these issues were placed alongside the Aristotelian philosophy and subjected to 
rigorous examination. The brief account given so far can serve as a background to the 
task facing Thomas, he is aiming at a philosophical study o f what it means to be a
10 Ibid., p. 3.
11 Encyclopaedia o f  Philosophy Vols. 1-2. p. 158.
12 Aristotle, De Anima, II i 412b 4-6 quoted in Dunne, M. Aristotle (384-321 B.C.) on the Life- 
Principle. Greek and Hellenistic 2000 -  Faculty o f  Philosophy, p. 4.
13 Ibid.
human being, treating the body and soul as correlates, explaining the unity o f soul and 
body as a unity of form and matter, without this unity we do not have a complete 
human being.14
14Dunne, Three Thirteenth century authors on the soul. p. 13.
St. Thomas’s theory of the soul
Thomas begins his study by questioning what can be said about (1) soul itself (2) 
soul’s union with the body and (3) powers o f the soul taken generally. The term 
“soul” is also used to refer to that part o f the intellect or mind that is immaterial, or, in 
a modem sense it may be said to refer to the spiritual dimension in human nature. In 
the course o f the discussion Thomas argues philosophically that the soul and the body 
form a composite -  that a living human being is a unity o f form and matter and this in 
a unique and individual way -  and that the way in which a human being understands 
universal meanings and makes free decisions also points to the non-corporeal nature 
o f soul.
Actuality as non-bodily
Turning now to question 75 o f the first part o f the Summa Theologiae (hereafter 
referred to as ST) article one is concerned with whether the soul is corporeal and in 
the corpus o f the article the argument for the soul’s incorporeality rests on Aristotle’s 
explanation o f form as actuality. Thomas distinguishes various principles of life e.g. 
the eye as the principle of sight -  it is an actuating principle because it is a body of 
such-and-such a kind. Actuating principles such as sight, hearing and heart, are 
corporeal but the soul as the first principle of life encompasses the whole o f what it is 
to be a human person -  the visible and the invisible. Pasnau uses the example o f the 
heart to explain Thomas’s “body of such-and-such a kind”15 -  what we have in mind 
is the structure and function o f the heart not the physical stuff that comprises the
15 Quod autem est actu tale habet hoc ab aliquo principio quod dicitur actus eius ST .la , q.75, a .i. 
(Responsio).
Concept of Soul
heart. When it comes to a living as opposed to a dead body we talk about a principle, 
the soul, from which it receives its actuality.
There are significant limits to Thomas’s argument in article 1 (Q75) according to 
Anthony Kenny who comments on the comparison made between the non-bodily 
nature of the soul to the non-bodily nature o f heat. Heat, he argues is a property of 
matter in the same way as shape belongs to something but it is not a “this something”. 
While we certainly have to accept that soul can only be described in abstract terms 
and perhaps, as Pasnau suggests, Thomas may be generalising, extending his remarks 
to all natural phenomena, living and non-living, nonetheless it is an unlikely 
comparison. It compares a substantial with an accidental form -  heat could never exist 
without a subject, without being the heat o f  something. It does seem here that to be an 
actuality is to be incorporeal. However we should be aware that Thomas changes his 
emphasis as he proceeds “sometimes (he) treats the body as the whole material 
substance o f which the actualities are parts” at another time it is stated that 
corporeality is a first form that is received in matter but subsequent to receiving this 
first form the body does not contain any further actualities -  the suggestion is that all 
actualities are contained within the soul, but as Pasnau states that leaves out accidental 
forms such as colour of hair etc.16 There are, it seems, different degrees of actuality -  
the more things become material, the less actuality they possess. Thus, prime matter 
although it is a concept which we understand as that which remains when all actuality 
is stripped away, it is the most incomplete o f all beings since it can have no existence 
and no actuality.
16 Pasnau, R. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 
408 (note 6).
10
Thomas often writes of the relationship between soul and body as in Aristotelian 
hylomorphism -  he develops the theory to say that in the relationship, the body, which 
is mutable and composed of matter and form, is actualised by the soul that is the form 
or actuality o f the body. The argument for saying that soul is a form just so and 
absolutely 17 rests on the distinction between the forms received by the senses and 
those received by the intellect. The senses receive the form of things in a physical 
organ -  only knowing the singular because o f its material composition e.g., in the case 
of sight -  the form of sight is the visual power which receives sight from the bodily 
organ whereas the intellective soul knows forms apart from the concrete and therefore 
is itself not composed of matter and form.18 The question whether the soul is 
composed of form and matter raises the issue of spiritual matter -  a theory of soul first 
posited by Ibn Gebirol (1021-1058 -  known in the west as Avicebron) in the Fons 
Vitae (The Source o f  Life). Many wrongly attributed the origin o f the doctrine (known 
as the doctrine o f universal hylormorphism) to the writings o f St. Augustine but it 
appealed to St. Bonaventure as it “had the advantage o f offering a clear defence o f the 
radical difference between the created and the Creator.”19 The doctrine is based on the 
premise that all matter is essentially potentiality -  therefore intellect that passes from 
ignorance to knowledge is matter -  not corporeal matter but a spiritual sense of 
matter. Thomas rejects this theory stating that the acquisition of knowledge relies on 
the absorption of universal ideas that do not pertain to matter. Thomas’s theory of 
universal ideas will be discussed in connection with his theory o f the agent intellect 
and its abstractive powers.
17 ST .la, q.75, a.5. (Responsio) .
18 Ibid. Si enim anima intellectiva esset composita ex materia et forma, formae rerum reciperentur in ea 
ut individuales; et sic non cognosceret nisi singulare, sicut accidit in potentiis sensitivis, quae recipiunt 
formas rerum in organo corporali. Materia enim est principium individuationis formarum.
19 Dunne, Three Thirteenth Century Authors on the Soul. p. 3.
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In his investigations on the soul’s union with the body (Q.76) Thomas sets himself a 
number of questions that concentrate on how understanding is linked to a body. The 
obvious argument that we are individually aware, that each of us recognises and is 
aware that we can communicate is demonstrated by comparing how a colour is seen 
by a “seer” but remains in the object, to how an object is presented to each intellect 
and how its meaning is understood by the individual. Also the fact that each o f us 
experiences sensations can only mean that the intellect is in some way connected to 
the body. But how can something immaterial be linked to something material? It is 
wrong to say that it is linked to the body as its mover or that someone understands 
something because he is moved into action by his understanding since drive or 
motivation as an intellectual activity must precede understanding. The doctrine o f soul 
using the body as an instrument -  as body being used for understanding is rejected as 
it implies a purely physical communication. Thomas’s argument relies on a principle 
that equates being and unity, as a complete substance an individual is a being in the 
fullest sense and is therefore an unum simpliciter.20 Pasnau applies a broad 
metaphysical account to explain Thomas’s position regarding the understanding 
which is united to the body as its form.21 While he acknowledges that matter and form 
are central to the theory Pasnau proposes taking matter as an actuality to help explain, 
among others things, the unity o f body and soul. Actuality is a basic principle for 
Thomas -  reality is understood as composites o f certain sorts o f actuality. Viewed as a 
manifestation o f actuality matter is subject to change, namely, alteration, generation 
and corruption but non-material substance is free o f all such actuality, is subsistent
20 Sic enim aliquid est ens quomodo et unum. ST .la, q.76, a .i. (Responsio).
21 Ibid. ...quod hie homo intelligit quia principium intellectivum est forma ipsius. Sic ergo ex ipsa 
operatione intellectus apparet quod intellectivum principium unitur corpori ut forma. See also Pasnau, 
pp. 138-139.
Union of body and soul
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• • 22 and can in principle exist apart from the body. The evidence for the soul’s
subsistence, that is, that it has an independent existence, is provided by the fact that
the mind is capable o f knowing “the natures of all bodily things.” Thus the mind is
distinguished from the physical because it is not determined in the same way as for
example sight or hearing are restricted by nature. The claim that the intellect does not
operate through a bodily organ does not mean that Thomas is denying any role to the
senses, but only that he believes in a power of the intellect or soul which is not acted
upon in a material or sensory way.
Question 76 can be better understood in light of this -  mind or intellect is composed 
of two parts -  the first is the understanding while the second part is connected to the 
body through the nervous system24 or what we today would call the brain. Thus there 
are parts of the soul that actualise the body in a material sense (how positive thoughts 
have positive effects on the body) and those that actualise it in the formal immaterial 
sense. The rational soul, according to Pasnau’s reading, contains various types of 
actualities. The term “bundles o f actualities” seems to reduce human beings to their 
souls but instead Pasnau believes that Thomas’s single form of soul gives rise to a 
body “composed of a complex variety o f actualised forms which is nevertheless one
O f
thing in the strongest sense.
22 Separata autem a corpore habebit alium modum intelligendi, similem aliis substantiis a corpore 
separatis, ut infra melius patebit. ST. la, q.75, a.6 ad 3.
23 ST .la, q.75, a.2. (Responsio).
24 ...quae quidem habet duplex subjectum: unum scilicet intellectum possibilem, et aliud ipsa 
phantasmata quae sunt in organis corporeis. ST .la, q.76, a .i. (Responsio).
25 Pasnau, p. 139.
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The question of individual mind caused lively debate in Thomas’s time and is 
addressed in Question 76, article 2 o f the first part o f the Summa Theologiae -  where 
Thomas discusses the view held by Averroes that there is one intellect for all men. 
Originating with the difficulty in interpreting Aristotle’s text regarding intellect, it 
gave rise to great debate with regard to the traditional teaching on personal 
immortality. Thomas provides various reasons why there cannot be just one intellect 
for all men -  he argues (la , q.76, a.2, objection 2) that such a view would abolish the 
different rewards and punishments allotted to individuals. Such a view would lead to 
absurd consequences -  there must be as many men as there are intellects. For Thomas 
the soul is individuated by the form of the body, the beliefs and judgements I hold are 
distinguished from those held by someone else. The rational soul is the form of the 
body and as the soul’s existence involves embodiment it could only make sense to 
speak of an individual soul belonging to an individual person. Intellect he states 
enjoys a “principle” in relation to man’s other faculties -  just as we have distinct 
sense-powers we also have distinct intellects. If it was the case o f just one intellect 
how could we explain how in many situations there are different views, and how we 
need to enter into dialogue to find common ground (la , q.76, a.2, objection 4).
One Substance -  One Soul
Pasnau connects this passage with some of Thomas’s views on life after death. The 
idea that death is merely a separation o f soul and body goes back to Plato but Thomas, 
unlike Plato, believes that when I die, I, as a complete human being, go out o f 
existence but my soul continues to exist apart from my body until the Last Day of 
Judgement. Pasnau interprets Thomas’s statement in (la, q.76, a.2, objection 2) as
Individuality
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saying that while the number o f souls accords with the number o f bodies what he 
means is that souls are not individuated by their bodies. Souls are substances that have 
individual characteristics from birth, although the soul changes over time there is in 
each o f us a central core that makes us who we are -  this marks out the differences 
between one individual and another.26 This allows for theories of personal identity 
that endure beyond bodily and psychological change.
What is most puzzling to Pasnau is that according to Thomas the separated soul is 
“not I”. However what is more important in Thomas’s view is that separated soul
97gives a “crucial place to bodily resurrection.” Taking the view that a person’s soul is 
not entirely that person, but that it is a part of the person, Pasnau suggests we could 
say that “I” partly continue to exist. But to be fully human requires both body and 
soul and while we may not comprehend how souls exist between the moment of death 
and resurrection as Christians we are familiar with the doctrine that our bodies will be 
united to our souls on the last day. The Resurrection is not amenable to proof 
according to Thomas but his metaphysical concept o f the formal matter of 
individuation provides the basis for his belief that “separated souls must be re-united
9Xwith the same bodies they once had.”
The next two articles o f question 76 deal with two closely related issues coming under 
the heading o f the plurality o f forms debate. Thomas opposes the view that there are 
in man three different souls -  sensitive, nutritive and rational. His consistent argument 
is one substance, one substantial form; the sensory and by implication the nutritive
25 Pasnau, p. 385
27 Ibid., p. 389.
28 Ibid., p. 390.
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9 Q  ■ •soul is cast off when the rational soul is infused into the body. The unicity-of-form 
doctrine was Thomas’s greatest contribution to medieval scholasticism but many 
opposed his view, such as Peter John Olivi (1247-1298) and John Peckam (1220- 
1292). Thomas holds that “the rational soul corrupts all prior forms, whereas Peckam 
and others believe that the rational soul perfects these prior forms.”30 In the last article 
(a.8) Thomas reaffirms his position regarding the soul’s unity with the body. Because 
it is a substantive not an accidental form, soul gives existence and is present to each 
part of the body.
Question 77 di stinguishes between the essence o f the soul and the activity o f the soul 
-  between what a thing is and its potentiality. There is no such distinction in God, his 
essence and capacities are one and the same. The human soul’s activities are 
potentialities, not actualities; intellect, for example, is just one among many powers. 
Pasnau develops this in the context o f question 79 article 1 which focuses specifically 
on the case of intellect. Identifying the essence of soul with its activity would entitle 
us to say that having a soul involves constant activity o f either the senses or of
•  * 31intellect -  just as having a soul means always being alive (vivere est esse). But we 
cannot be said to be always using the powers o f  the intellect or the senses, therefore, it 
is concluded that the power to carry out certain operations is not identified with the 
soul’s essence.
This was a major topic of debate among Thomas’s contemporaries and after his death; 
his theory was rejected by Henry of Ghent (1217-1293), John Duns Scotus (1265-
29 Ad tertium dicendum quod prius embryo habet animam quae est sensitiva tantum; qua abjecta, 
advenit perfectior anima, quae est simul sensitiva et intellectiva, ut infra plenius ostendetur. ST .la, 
q.76, a.3 ad 3.
30 Pasnau, p. 128.
31 Ibid., p. 154.
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1308) and William of Ockham (1285-1347). Their arguments must be presented 
alongside Averroes’s view that all human beings share a common intellect as 
described above. Rather than distinguishing the soul’s essence and its capacities 
Scotus and Ockham accepted the plurality o f forms theory -  that different forms 
compose the soul, that the powers o f the soul are identified with it and that there is a 
separate form within the soul that actualises it. Scotus wanted to eliminate all 
distinctions between the soul and its capacities, and he appeals to the authority o f St. 
Augustine, as did many authors in the thirteenth century who did not approve of the 
use o f Aristotle’s metaphysics, particularly in matters o f theology. Ockham, following 
Scotus, employed the line o f reasoning for which he is most famous -  his principle o f 
parsimony, that there is no point in doing something through many things if it can be
T9done through fewer.
Thomas distinguishes the soul’s essence and its capacities when he states that the 
intellect and each o f the capacities flow from the soul’s essence (la , q.77, a.6, 
corpus). Capacities are further distinguished in terms of their objects and actions (la, 
q.77, a.3) -  an action differentiates its power. Against this it is argued that capacities 
are prior to actions33 which Thomas concedes but states that an act is at first a concept 
and can be understood as a goal or something that is pursued according to a plan (la , 
q.77, a.3, ad 1). A further distinction is made between those capacities that operate 
without a corporeal organ (intellect and will) that “have the soul’s essence as their 
subject”34 (la , q.77, a.5, corpus) and the remaining capacities that have the composite
32Reportatio 11.20. (Pg 436). Although the principle is associated with Ockham, Scotus had already 
appealed to a similar principle in denying the real distinction: “We should posit few, where many are 
not necessary” (Reportatio 11.16; vol.23, p. 73). Quoted in Pasnau, p. 427 (note 13).
33 Actus autem est posterior potentia; objectum autem est extrinsecum. Ergo per ea potentiae non 
distinguuntur secundum speciem. ST .la, q.77, a.3, objection 1.
34 Pasnau, p. 161.
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of body and soul as their subject. Apart from these distinctions the question again
arises as to how intellect is related to the soul. Pasnau returns to “the soul’s union
• • • • with the body”(la , q.76), which according to him is the “linchpin of the Treatise” -
there the explanation is that “each man understands because his intellective principle
is his formative principle” (la , q.76, a .l). The argument serves two purposes -  on the
one hand we identify this principle with the soul and on the other hand it leaves room
to establish that intellect and will are parts o f the human soul and like all the soul’s
capacities flow from the soul’s essence. Pasnau makes various connections between
questions 76 and 77 and refers to the associations made by Thomas with regard to
intellect and the soul stating that the explanation for the soul “as the principle of
intellective cognition”36 at least discharges the claim that all human beings share a
single intellect.
Concluding remarks
Pasnau refers to a number o f authors who claim that Thomas’s account looks like a 
type o f dualism. The human being is clearly defined as a composite o f body and soul 
and Thomas gives philosophical arguments for the soul’s immortality. However the 
theory goes beyond a dualistic account and to my mind the explanation given by 
Pasnau -  that o f the two classes o f actuality, different in terms o f how it occurs in 
material as opposed to immaterial being, expresses the unity that Thomas wants to 
convey. Body and soul exist, not as two separate entities but in and through and for 
the sake of the other.
35 Pasnau, p. 163.
36 Ibid., p. 164.
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There is something puzzling, as Pasnau states surrounding the notion o f the separated 
soul as being not “I” when separated from my body. Does this lead to the position of 
one intellect for all men? Perhaps it is that part o f the mind which for Thomas is the 
key to his ethics — the will, which I will discuss later in its relationship to intellect, 
reason and free will.
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Before entering into a discussion regarding the intellect we will first look at the role 
of the senses that are described as the prerequisites of intelligence. Describing 
Thomas’s treatment of the senses both Pasnau (2002) and Kenny (1993) state that he 
pays less attention to the senses than a modern reader would expect. However, much 
to his credit and despite the often very negative views regarding the human body 
during his lifetime and after, he does place great emphasis on the role o f the senses in 
his study o f human nature. Pasnau states in Thomas’s defence that he shows himself 
as too much o f a philosopher to “let so interesting a subject pass without study.” 
Question 78 of the first part o f the ST. describes the senses as one o f a set o f powers, 
which belong to the soul, the external senses include the traditional five -  sight, 
hearing, touch, taste and smell.
•■jo t (  _
Although Thomas refutes the possibility o f more than one soul he does distinguish 
between different powers o f the soul, the vegetative, the sense-soul and the rational 
soul. The corpus o f article 1 distinguishes the powers according to their objects; thus 
the object of the vegetative power is no more than the body, the object o f the senses 
are not just an individual’s own body but also outside bodies and the object o f the 
intellectual powers extends to universal being. Two further distinctions are made 
when considering the powers that relate to external objects; first the powers that take 
in information through sensation or the intellect and secondly where the power o f the 
soul is drawn to the object either through the appetitive power which sets up the 
objects as goals to be pursued or through the locomotive power which enables the
37 Ibid., p. 172.
38 Ibid., p. 163.
Sensation
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an
goals to be reached by bodily behaviour. The appetitive powers are treated in ST.la, 
qq. 80-83 which will be discussed shortly.
Thomas wants to show that the senses are given to us by nature for particular 
functions -  the sensible features o f the world are so designed as to make an 
impression on our senses which are distinguished according “to the differences among 
those sensible features and the differences among the kind of impressions they 
make.”40 Pasnau discusses some of the difficulties involved in Thomas’s overly 
mechanical application o f the power-to-object doctrine. The objects o f sensation for 
Thomas are (1) the proper or primary sensibles -  those objects which can be detected 
using one sense, e.g., colour or sound; (2) the common or secondary sensibles which 
can be detected by more than one o f the senses e.g., shape and size which, as Kenny 
states can be seen as well as felt,41 these make an impact on the senses indirectly by 
having a quality -  an object being white or sweet. Both the proper and the common 
sensibles create impressions and alter our senses in a primary and secondary way 
respectively and are termed sensibilia per se. In contrast, things such as trees, birds 
and attributes, e.g., being a musical person are termed sensibilia per accidens since 
they themselves are not sense objects but are manifested to us through the sensible 
qualities of colour, sound, touch etc. Sensation for human beings is therefore almost 
always sensation per accidens. We can, as humans, explain the various sensations we 
experience since they are “accompanied by continuous conceptualisation.”42 In this 
respect, Pasnau states, it is irrelevant “whether the small yellow shape you see
39 ...ad consequendum enim aliquod desideratum et intentum omne animal movetur. ST.la, q.78, a.l
(Responsio).
40 Pasnau, p. 186.
41 Kenny, A. Aquinas on Mind. London and New York: Routledge, 1993. p. 35.
42 Pasnau, p. 271.
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happens to be a real bird or a mechanical bird.”43 The difficulty that Pasnau highlights 
is Thomas’s insistence that the proper sensibles are the primary objects o f sensation. 
According to Pasnau Thomas had to have been aware o f the commonly held view that 
all sensible qualities such as colour, sound and heat are reducible to various kinds of 
objects in motion -  the case of sound could be explained as “a product o f the air’s 
being put into local motion.”44 But Thomas views the primary sensibles as the basic 
features of the external world that cannot be reduced to the category of quantity. His 
explanation for the transmission o f sound depends rather on a causal link.45 While 
Kenny46 dismisses much o f Thomas’s account o f the physical processes o f sense 
perception as almost always mistaken Pasnau attempts to rescue it by appealing to a 
form of modem physicalism -  in the case o f colour, e.g., he states that the quantities 
involved are “the reflective properties o f a surface”47 and that “it is this quantity that 
makes an impression, primarily and per se, on the senses.”
External and Internal Senses
In the next two articles Thomas discusses the external and internal senses, the senses 
for Thomas are passive in nature and are changed through the action o f an external 
sense-object. Two types o f change are necessary for changes in sensation to take place 
( 1) is the natural type o f change when e.g., the form of heat acts on something (this 
applies to animate or inanimate objects) and (2) change is described as intentional 
when it acts on the sense or senses -  when sight is involved the form of colour acts on
43 Ibid., p. 270.
44 Ibid., p. 184.
45 Nam sonus ex percussione causatur et aeris commotione. ST .la, q.78, a.3. (Responsio).
46 Kenny, p. 34.
47 Pasnau, p. 185 and see p. 431 (note 16). “More precisely: ‘O f all those things around us which 
“have” a particular colour, the great majority owe their colour to their ability to absorb light o f some 
energies more readily than light o f  others.... A given material can absorb protons only o f particular 
energies because each arrangement o f an electron cloud contains a specified amount o f energy’ 
(Rossotti 1983, pp. 38-39).
48 Ibid., p. 185.
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its passive power to be received by the eye. The senses differ in their mode o f 
intentionality -  sight for example is the most purely intentional since no change takes 
place in the eye itself or in the object sensed. The question o f infallibility enters into 
any account o f cognition, and although the external senses have been designed by 
nature to be reliable sources o f detection Thomas’s account allows for the fact that 
things do go wrong, this may be due to particular circumstances that impede the 
senses or a person can be mistaken due to injury or loss of a particular sense.
Common Sense
Turning to the internal senses Thomas questions how an animal can grasp a thing not 
only when it is present but also when it is absent, also how animals receive the form 
of sense objects, retain and conserve them. These faculties, common to both man and 
animals are common sense, the imagination, the estimative power (instinct in animals) 
and memory. According to Pasnau the common sense is the source and also the 
terminus of the impressions received by the external senses. Taken literally Thomas 
states that each particular sense appropriates its proper object but that something has 
to account for how we discriminate between the objects o f the senses neither sight 
nor taste can discern the difference between white and sweet”49 this is the task o f the 
common sense or, as Pasnau calls it, a comparitive operation. A second function of 
the common sense is what Pasnau terms a second-order perception “it is one thing to 
sense a sensible quality, another to sense one’s sensing of that sensible quality.”50 The 
distinction is made in order to abstract the sense with which man and animal alike 
assemble sensory information into a unified whole. With regard to the senses the
49 Ad secundum dicendum quod sensus proprius judicat de sensibili proprio, discemendo ipsum ab aliis 
quae cadunt sub eodem sensu, sicut discemendo ipsum ab aliis quae cadunt sub eodem sensu, sicut 
discemendo album a nigro vel a viridi. Sed discemere album a dulci non potest neque visus neque 
gustus, quia oportet quod qui inter aliqua discemit, utrumque cognoscat. ST .la, q.78, a.4 ad 2.
50 Pasnau, p. 193.
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common sense is perceptual rather than conceptual, but this is at a basic level of 
performance. As we go up the scale the common sense does have an influence on the 
intellect e.g., we make judgements that involve both sensory and intellectual 
responses.
Estimative/Cogitative Power
The estimative power, vis aestimativa is what we commonly call instinct in animals; it 
explains how animals know certain things that are useful or harmful to it -  the sheep 
fears the wolf because its estimative power triggers a warning. Animal instinct goes 
no further than the demands o f its bodily functions and needs, but as human beings we 
can conceptualise, reason and reflect on our fears and desires. This power is called 
cogitation, vis cogitative when applied to the human mind. Also called the particular 
reason it compares “individual intentions” in the way that the reasoning intellect 
compares “universal intentions”(la , q.78, a.4, corpus). Animals lack the sort of 
conceptualisation that enables human beings to see objects as belonging to this or that 
category, “the closest animals come to such categorising is when they put something 
into the class o f things to be fled or pursued.”51 It is also, according to some Thomists, 
the power which grasps the individual existence o f things.
Imagination
The imagination, phantasia is a treasure store of information (la , q.78, a.4) received 
through the senses, it is the power of the mind to retain and produce phantasms or 
images. It composes and divides imagined things viz., we can combine the image of 
gold and the image o f mountain to produce the single form of a golden mountain. In
51 Pasnau, p. 271.
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his commentary Kenny is critical o f Thomas’s positioning o f the imagination among 
what he calls the “genuine” senses. Imagination cannot be held up to examination as 
is the case o f the senses -  it belongs to the individual and can be deemed neither right 
nor wrong. To paraphrase Kenny’s remarks -  he states that there is no such thing as 
putting a man right about the contents o f his imagination and on this account he 
concludes that a sense-faculty that cannot go wrong is not a sense faculty at all.52 
Kenny highlights an altogether different aspect o f the imagination, that o f the creative 
imagination o f the poets, the scientist and the storyteller but this he maintains, would 
more appropriately be considered among the intellectual powers. The imagination for 
Thomas simply stores images; they do not necessarily involve further associations 
whereas memory is left with the impressions from the past.
Sense-Memory
Memory is a capacity which receives further discussion as one o f a number of 
intellectual powers but here as one o f the internal senses it is attributed to man and 
animal alike, but, while both share the capacity to remember things from the past only 
humans have the power to recall things -  this is called reminiscentia. Memory is a 
power to conserve intentions -  those things we have already instinctively learned 
from experience, and although we now know that memory “goes far beyond mere 
repetition and association”54 it makes sense to say that instinct combined with 
memory explains how over time an animal becomes familiar with its surroundings 
and instinctively recognises and trusts its master.
52 Kenny, p. 39.
53 Ex parte autem memorativae, non solum habet niemoriam sicut cetera animalia in subita recordatione 
praeteritorum, sed etiam reminiscentiam, quasi syllogistice inquirendo praeteritorum niemoriam, 
secundum individuales intentiones. ST .la, q.78, a.4. (Responsio).
54 Summa Theologiae .Vol.XI. p. 140 (note b).
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The senses are for Thomas entirely physical -  while soul and body constitute one 
agent, performing one activity, sensation is entirely due to changes in the body. 
Pasnau quotes from (la , q.78, a .l, corpus) which states that sensation is not brought 
about through any “bodily quality” -  suggesting a non-material explanation of sense 
experience. But Thomas is referring to the four elements -  earth, air, fire and water -  
and their associated qualities and, as Pasnau explains, “bodily quality” belongs to the 
language of pre-modern science. Thomas is dismissing the elements as an explanation 
for the basic operations o f  life and attributes this power to the heavenly bodies. 
Supporting this Pasnau quotes from Thomas’s work entitled Sentencia libri De anima 
(reference abbreviated to InDA) -  “rays from the heavenly bodies transform all of 
lower nature.”55 Thomas wants to explain sensation in terms of matter alone, the life- 
giving elements o f the sun’s rays although composed o f a different kind of matter than 
that found on earth is biologically responsible for much o f our plant, animal and 
human needs but this requires further study and explanation in light o f developments 
in the sciences since the Middle Ages. There is much in the account o f human 
reproduction also that is open to correction but if  we consider the fact that 
spermatozoa within semen were only discovered in 167 756 we can appreciate the 
earlier difficulties that faced those concerned with ethical questions such as abortion 
and the debate concerning when human life begins. Again the spontaneous generation 
of life from matter was only refuted by Pasteur in 1859.
55 InDA II. 14.303-4. (Leonine vol. 45,1) -  quoted in Pasnau, p. 63.
56 Pasnau, p. 104.
Despite Pasnau’s statement that Thomas’s theory o f sensation is “heavily indebted to 
earlier thinkers,”57 his emphasis on the senses as a primary source o f knowledge 
deserves special mention. This was a time when the Christian message was one o f 
charity and love for mankind and yet people lived with the fear o f punishment and 
final damnation for their transgressions. In particular, the body was considered a 
major source of temptation. Thomas showed great courage in attributing such 
importance to the senses; in doing so he paved the way for much debate among the 
empirical and idealist views of his successors.
From a philosophical point o f view the senses must be considered alongside the 
intellect, this is a topic which I will return to later in the discussion on the agent or 
abstractive intellect. To place the discussion within a modem context I recently heard 
a discussion on radio reporting on research currently being carried out by students on 
a condition known as “synaesthesia.”58 This is where there is confusion among the 
senses, it is a sensation produced at a point different from the point of stimulation e.g., 
in colour-hearing. It is not in any way debilitating and it was said that, on the contrary 
people have used it to their advantage in devising memory techniques. Research into 
this and other connections between the senses and the intellect can help us to further 
our understanding o f the cognitive power. The senses for Thomas make various 
connections, both externally and internally. They have no meaning apart from the 
body, in this they are like the rest o f the physical world and understood in this way re-
Concluding rem arks
57 Ibid., p. 172.
58 Interview o f 12th March 2004 on RTE radio 1 with Dr. Fiona Newell -  Lecturer in Cognitive Nuero 
Science and Ciara Finucane -  Researcher. They are involved in a project with the Genetics department, 
Trinity College, Dublin, and are both part o f the psychology department.
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enforce Thomas’s belief that intellect and will remain in the body after death but that 
the sensory soul of human beings as is the case for animals, is not subsistent.
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Intellect
Soul gives life to plants, animals and man alike but what distinguishes man’s life is 
the rational soul, the intellect -  it transcends both the vegetative and sensory powers 
of the soul.
Thomas’s philosophy of mind begins with the question (la , q.79, a .l) -  whether the 
intellect is a capacity of the soul or whether it is its essence. In the reply Thomas 
states that essence (essentia) is related to existence (esse)59 in the same way that a 
power is related to its activity -  a potentiality that is actuated by some outside agent. 
The priority of the soul in relation to any or all o f its activities has already been 
established; that the soul is the first principle o f life (la , q.75, a .l, corpus); that the 
essence of the soul is distinguished from its power in terms o f a first “act ordered 
towards second act.”60 The first actuality is simply to exist as a hoc aliquid -  “this sort 
of existence is precisely what the soul’s essence brings about,”61 second actuality is 
the operations that are carried out by a human being (la , q.77, a .l, corpus); we are 
told also that all the capacities o f the soul flow from the essence o f the soul (la , q.77,
a.6). To say that the intellect / understanding is the soul’s essence is to say that it is 
identical to the soul, that the intellect itself is its being but it is in God alone whose act 
o f understanding is His very Being. The distinction between the essence and existence 
of God and that of man can be explained in terms o f the composite nature o f human 
beings. The essence o f a material substance lies not only in the composition of form 
and matter but “there is another composition in them, between the composite essence
59 Sicut enim potentia se habet ad Operationen! ut ad suum actum, ita se habet essentia ad esse. ST .la, 
q.79, a .l. (Responsio).
60 Et sic ipsa anima, secundum quod subest suae potentiae, dicitur actus primus ordinates ad actum 
secundum. ST. la, q.77, a .l. (Responsio).
61 Pasnau, p. 156.
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ft 9 • •and the act of existence.” These must be regarded in one sense as really distinct or 
as Spade states “one could not really know what a thing is without knowing whether it 
is.”63 In God there is no such composition -  His essence is his act o f existing.
Active and Passive Intellect
The understanding is therefore a power of the soul, it functions in two ways -  first the 
mind is said to be passive (la , q.79, a.2), it is as a thing which can receive something 
without losing anything thereby. Initially human understanding “has no concepts and 
exercises no judgements;”64 we begin our lives with a mind like a blank page on 
which nothing is written, a tabula rasa. We are first able to understand and afterwards 
we come actually to understand, thus the passivity involved in the intellect is when 
something it starts from a state of potentiality becomes one o f actuality, when it 
knows. Secondly, human beings have what is known as the agent or active intellect 
(la. q.79, a.3) -  each person has their own agent intellect. This accounts for the 
mind’s ability to abstract universal concepts from the particular sense experience. The 
agent intellect actualises those things held “potentially” in the passive intellect -  it is 
needed to actualise intelligible things by abstracting the thought o f  them from their 
material conditions65
This power of abstraction raises another area o f contention among many philosophers 
from as far back as Porphyry (c.A.D. 232-304). In the Isagoge or introduction to the
Categories of Aristotle, he posed three questions concerning genera and species
62 Spade, P.V., “Medieval Philosophy,” in The Oxford Illustrated History o f  Western Philosophy. 
Kenny, A. (ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. p. 91.
63 Ibid.
64 Summa Theologiae. Vol.XI. pp. 150-151 (note b).
65 Oportebat igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus quae faceret intelligibilia in actu per 
abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus. ST.la, q.79, a.3. (Responsio).
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(Boethius translated the work into Latin). As Luscombe points out Porphyry “states 
but does not seek to pursue the question whether these predicables exist in human 
understanding only or also in reality, whether also they are incorporeal or corporeal, 
and whether they exist apart from sensible objects or only with them.”66 The question 
raised the problem of how we understand something in the mind as universal and 
outside the mind as individual and sensible. Thomas believed that the intellect is 
capable o f grasping concepts but because o f its function o f abstraction it cannot 
directly cognise particular corporeal things. On the other side the senses cannot 
cognise universals because they cannot receive an immaterial form. Scotus held the 
opposite view -  that the intellect is able to grasp the individual as such. He 
distinguished two types of knowledge, intuitive knowledge -  what we know to exist, 
and abstractive knowledge -  which answers to the question o f what a thing is, its 
“thisness”. It would seem preferable to follow in the Scotist tradition -  i.e., that each 
individual person or object has its own unique haecceitas -  its own essence that can 
be grasped by the intellect. However, both Pasnau and Kenny interpret Thomas as 
saying that it is not possible for us to attain knowledge o f individuals by intellect 
alone, that anything appearing before us is going beyond intellectual thought. Even if 
we speak of something in place and time we have left the realm of pure thought. It is 
by combining the universal ideas with sensory experience that we come to know the 
individual. Thomas’s view becomes clear when he refers to the universal nature in the 
particular67, the nature o f a human being apart from the particular human being.
66 Luscombe, D. Medieval Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. p. 18.
67 Pasnau, p. 317.
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Memory
Memory as belonging to the senses -  the body’s matter68 is distinguished from the 
greater power of the understanding to retain knowledge. The latter is a power more 
stable and unchanging than any physical thing and belongs to the intellectual part of 
the soul.69 Sense-memory which fixes a thing in the past belongs to the realm o f the 
particular and therefore corresponds to a bodily organ, what we normally refer to as 
the brain. This reinforces what has already said about memory in animals, it is just as 
important for their survival as it is for humans but it belongs to man to remember the 
pleasure experienced in e.g. listening to a particular piece o f music or to recall as St. 
Augustine states “the innumerable principles and laws o f numbers and dimensions.”70
Reason
Reason and understanding belong to the same power, man as a rational animal uses
• 71 • • • •his reason to understand and to grasp the truth o f anything. Reason is divided into 
two distinct functions, according to Augustine wisdom is attributed to the higher 
reason, science to the lower. While angelic power of knowledge is in the same 
category as man’s rational power angels have perfect possession o f truth whereas man 
comes to the truth in a less perfect manner. Just as we understand eternity through 
our understanding of temporal things so also we have a notion o f the Divine through 
understanding created things (la , q.79, a.9, responsio). Reasoning is to understanding
68 ST.la, q.79, a.6. (Responsio).
69 Ibid.
70 Augustine, Confessions. Book X.xii (19). Oxford W orld’s Classics. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991. p. 190.
71 ST.la, q.79, a.8. (Responsio).
72 Et ideo vis cognoscitiva angelorum non est alterius generis a vi cognoscitiva rationis, sed comparatur 
ad ipsam ut perfectum ad imperfectum. ST.la, q.79, a.8 ad 3.
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* • • 73as acquiring is to having -  from first principles it studies what has been found. This 
article refers to the role of reason with reference to the intellectual powers but reason 
also influences our judgements as regards the appetitive powers o f the soul i.e., the 
sensory and intellective desires which are discussed in the next section.
Other activities of the Soul
The only separation o f powers for Thomas is between the abstractive and the recipient 
powers. Intelligence, which Aristotle states is concerned with basic simplicities where 
error does not enter (la , q.79, a. 10, sed contra), is an activity o f the mind that is 
included among a number of different states o f understanding. Likewise the 
speculative and practical minds are distinguished only in their intentions. The 
speculative or theoretic mind knows but does not relate what it knows to action merely 
considering the truth', whereas we speak o f  the mind as practical when it orders what 
it knows to action.74
Synderesis is another activity of the soul; it is described in article twelve o f question 
seventy-nine as a habit, a natural disposition through which we understand first 
principles in the moral sense. Pasnau states that Thomas holds that synderesis is never 
extinguished, that an individual knows when he is doing something wrong. Thomas’s 
position is stated in Quaestiones disputatae De veritate which is quoted by Pasnau as 
someone’s “ ... reason is weighed down by the disposition of vice, so that in choosing
73 ...inde est quod ratiocinatio humana secundum viam inquisitionis vel inventionis procedit a 
quibusdam simpliciter intellectus, quae sunt prima principia; et rursus in via judicii resolvendo redit ad 
prima principia ad quae inventa examinai. ST .la, q.79, a.8. (Responsio).
Nam intellectus speculativus est qui quod apprehendit non ordinat ad opus, sed ad solam veritatis 
considerationem; practicus vero intellectus dicitur qui hoc quod apprehendit, ordinat ad opus. ST .la, 
q.79, a. 11. (Responsio).
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« « • 7S « •he does not apply his universal judgement to the particular situation.” Conscience is 
distinguished from synderesis in that it applies principles to concrete situations -  
when we supply knowledge o f what we have done or intend doing our conscience 
responds appropriately. Both synderesis and conscience incite us to do good and deter 
us from  evil.76 But whereas synderesis is infallible, conscience “is a process of 
reasoning, and, like any such process, it can result in mistaken conclusions if  its
» • 77premises are false or it fails to be valid.”
Concluding remarks
The agent intellect for Thomas is the abstractive power to form concepts that cannot 
be derived from sense experience. Kenny states that Thomas’s theory o f the agent 
intellect places him in a middle position between empiricist philosophers who argue 
that the only knowledge which we can lay claim to arises from “recurrent features of 
experience and rationalist philosophers who claim that individual ideas are inborn in
• 78every member o f the species.” But according to Thomas there are no fully innate 
ideas, even propositions that are self-evident originate in concepts or ideas derived 
from experience. In holding that the mind begins as a tabula rasa Thomas is in 
agreement with the empiricists but against them and in agreement with the rationalists 
he believes that the experiences that animals share with humans cannot be the basis on 
which we form concepts and beliefs.
Both sense perception and the acquisition o f intellectual information are according to 
Thomas a matter o f the reception of forms in an immaterial manner in the mind. This
75 QDV. 16.3 ad 3, quoted in Pasnau, p. 244.
76 Unde et synderesis dicitur instigare ad bonum et murmurare de malo, inquantum per prima principia 
procedimus ad inveniendum et judicamus inventa. ST .la, q.79, a. 12. (Responsio).
77 Davies, B. The Thought o f  Thomas Aquinas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. p. 236.
78 Kenny, A. Aquinas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. p. 75.
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refers to Thomas’s doctrine o f the intentional existence o f forms. When I see an 
object it exists “intentionally” both in my vision and in my intellect, the former, 
existence in nature is called esse naturale, the latter, existence in mind, esse 
intentionale. The form exists without the matter o f which it is composed o f in reality. 
The form of an object exists in the individual object as individualised and as 
composed of matter and it also exists in my mind but as immaterial and universal. But 
intentional existence is not to be thought of as immaterial existence -  according to the 
theory when I see the redness of the setting sun redness exists in my eyes and “even in 
the eye the sensible form is a form of the matter to be found in the sense-organ.”79 
Intellect, because o f its nature -  because it is not composed o f matter has the ability to 
be informed by forms existing intentionally. Aquinas’s doctrine of the intentional 
existence o f forms is considered one of the most interesting contributions ever made 
to the philosophy o f mind. The doctrine raised the two deep philosophical problems -  
it is essential to any thoughts that they should be someone’s thoughts and that they 
should be thoughts o f  something. Thus Thomas, following in Aristotle’s footsteps, 
laid the foundation for the central ideas o f phenomenology, a whole new approach to 
philosophy devoted to the examination of consciousness and its objects. It derived 
many of its themes from the scholastic tradition although the meaning underwent 
considerable transformation. Phenomenology as inaugurated by Edmund Husserl 
(1859-1938) was first inspired by Franz Brentano (1838-1917) who “combined a
• • SOgrounding in Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy.”
79 Ibid., p. 79.
80 Moran, D. Introduction to Phenomenology. London: Routledge, 2000. p. 23.
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Appetitive powers of body and soul 
Sensory and Intellective appetites
The second great power o f the mind -  the will -  is the subject of the next three 
questions, (ST.la, qq. 80-83). First there is a general discussion as to what is meant by 
saying that the will is an appetitive power which functions as two distinct types o f 
appetite and secondly the will is discussed in relation to the other powers o f the soul.
At the most basic level of appetite is what is moved automatically, such as substances 
like fire and its tendency to spread or, as Kenny proposes, the vital activities of plants
R1 • •in their achievement o f growth. This is distinguished from the appetite in living 
things which goes beyond this natural inclination, it involves sensory appetite which 
is common to all living things. Thirdly, there is the intellectual or rational appetite 
which belongs to man alone. The appetitive power o f the soul can be defined as the
• 89ability to tend towards objects o f awareness.
Both Pasnau and Kenny point to difficulties in the criteria used to distinguish sensory
O'! t
and intellectual appetite. Kenny states that the official criterion for a sensory desire 
is that it is a want arising from sense-perception; on the one hand this will include the 
desires of the art-collector, which are according to Kenny intellectual rather than 
sensual; on the other hand it excludes hunger that arises from the sensuous aroma o f 
food in the vicinity. If the criterion is limited to stating that sensory wants are wants 
for sense-gratification this would leave out the many other functions of the sense 
appetite, especially those of its irascible component, such as the flight o f the lamb and
81 Kenny, Aquinas on Mind, p. 61.
82 Ibid., p. 60.
83 Ibid., p. 63.
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the charge of the bull. To say that wants are bodily feelings seems to include all 
natural desires yet a desire for a work o f art cannot be said to be a physical feeling. 
Thomas’s position could be upheld according to Pasnau if  we consider how such 
objects of desire are conceived. An appetitive power is described as a passive power, 
born to be moved by a thing apprehended84, focusing on what moves the appetite. 
Pasnau uses the example o f someone having a sensory and a rational desire for an 
orange -  they are different desires since one seeks to satisfy the specific sensory 
craving while the other conceives of the orange as being beneficial to one’s health.
This highlights the controversy over the will’s alleged passivity. Scotus, for example, 
following the Franciscan tradition, describes the will as simpliciter activa -  absolutely 
active; desire is the activating force in all that we do and, according to Suttor in an 
editorial comment “nothing created other than the will is the total cause of the will’s 
act of willing.”85 Suttor elaborates further that “whereas Scotus sought the key to the 
understanding o f human appetite in love-as-decision, Thomas found it in 
enjoyment.”86 Like Thomas, Duns Scotus put Aristotelian thought at the service of 
Christian theology but he and his followers opposed many of the tenets o f Thomism. 
Against Thomas, as we have seen, Scotus accepted the plurality o f forms but in 
particular he rejected Thomas’s theory o f the will since it placed excessive emphasis 
on the use of reason. This will be highlighted below when we examine Thomas’s 
arguments for freedom of the will in the treatise on happiness.
84 Potentia enim appetitiva est potentia passiva, quae nata est moveri ab apprehenso. ST.la, q.80, a.2.
(Responsio).
85 Summa Theologiae. Vol.XI. p. 267.
86“ But the real key to his short treatment o f appetite is the fact that a human drive is never just a drive 
to have something, it is a drive to have it and to have it in mind. Enjoyment is perfect in the knowledge 
that something is being enjoyed, as Kierkegaard, too, was to insist.” ST. Vol. XI. p. 197.
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Pasnau argues for both an active and passive sense of will in Thomas’s theory. 
Evidence for this can be seen in the activity o f the will in choosing and making 
decisions -  this will be discussed under the heading o f free-will. Thomas never claims 
that the will is not active -  that the will is passive in the sense that it is moved by its
on
object “does not preclude its being both active and free.”
To identify the will as rational appetite according to Pasnau is simply to identify the 
source o f the will’s choices. The will chooses according to reason but from among 
many alternatives — it is influenced and motivated by the emotions and by the 
passions. Article three of question eighty explains how the mind through reason and 
the will controls the passions i.e., the sensory appetite. The sensory appetite is our 
reaction to bodily needs and desires -  mainly hunger, thirst and sex. It has two 
components -  ( 1) concupiscible i.e., what the sensory soul desires and (2) irascible -
oo
what the sensory soul must fight off, it tends to overcome and rise above threats.
What has already been described as instinct in animals and the cogitative power in 
man also influences our reactions in any situation. But whereas the sheep runs away 
the moment it sees the wolf, man waits for the command o f the higher appetite -  the 
will. It is the will which first submits. As humans what we have to do is to try to 
resolve the conflicts that arise between reason on the one hand and sensation and 
imagination on the other.89 The will, however, has but one goal -  to act according to
87 Pasnau, p. 239.
88 Una per quam anima simpliciter inclinatur ad prosequendum ea quae sunt convenientia secundum 
sensum, et ad refugiendum nociva; et haec dicitur concupiscibilis. Alia vero per quam anima resistit 
impugnantibus quae convenientia impugnant et nocumenta inferunt; et haec vis vocatur irascibilis. 
ST.la, q.81, a.2. (Responsio).
89 Unde experimur irascibilem vel concupiscibilem rationi repugnare per hoc, quod sentimus vel 
imaginamur aliquod delectabile quod ratio vetat, vel triste quod ratio praecipit. ST .la, q.81, a.3 ad 2.
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one’s conception o f what is good -  the will is concerned with good in all its form s,90 
this is its one basic judgement.
As Pasnau states it might look as if Thomas’s ideal o f the virtuous person is a life 
entirely free o f passion -  it is, he states, the case that Thomas’s position is 
“diametrically opposed”91 to the philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) who was one 
of the major figures o f his century. Hume was sceptical about the reliability o f reason. 
As Popkin92 explains even the claims of mathematics and logic are questionable 
according to Hume’s account since they too are based on human interpretation. But 
Hume was directing his argument against our knowledge o f the world. According to 
Popkin Hume goes on, “to insist that although sceptics hold that all is uncertain and 
that we have no measures o f truth and falsehood, nobody was ever sincerely and 
constantly of this opinion.”93 As regards the passions Hume believed that the goals or 
end o f our behaviour are set by our desires and emotions, he stated famously that 
reason is and ought to be the slave o f the passions.94 From Pasnau’s wider reading of 
the Summa Theologiae he concludes that Thomas believes that some passions can 
have a positive effect on our lives. One type o f passion which he admires is that 
which is consequent to judgement, the passion to do something valuable — the 
irascible power for example, is a passion giving us the determination to fight for what 
we want. He rejects those passions which are acted upon without any prior judgement, 
reason or consideration of the consequences. In this context Pasnau95 makes reference 
to the distinguished philosopher -  Martha Nussbaum who takes the view that we can
90 ST.la, q.82, a.5. (Responsio).
91 Pasnau, p. 262.
92 Popkin, R. “David Hume” in The Pimlico History o f  Western Philosophy. London: Pimlico, 1999. p. 
457.
93 Ibid.
94 Pasnau, p. 262.
95 Ibid.
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learn from such passions and that they are often the best guides to appropriate action. 
Allowances must be made for both sides -  consider how raw emotions can and do 
contribute to our development but also given the uncertainty o f life we also need to 
consider the reasons and arguments before taking action.
Recent scholarship is also focussing on Thomas’s theory o f the emotions in the 
Summa and in his other works. In his paper -  “Aquinas and Emotional Theory Today” 
Patrick Gorevan discusses Thomas’s treatment o f the various aspects of the 
relationship between knowledge and emotion and the fact that his theories have a lot 
to offer to modern-day discussions of emotional theory. Briefly, Gorevan points out 
such themes as the unity o f emotion as expressed in Thomas’s conception o f passion, 
also the physical and emotional feelings connected to the passions which are 
described as acts of the sense appetite, but also passions o f the soul. In discussing the 
various responses to Thomas’s theory Gorevan refers to Thomas’s distinction between 
knowledge and emotion in order “to turn to the real and close links he (Thomas) finds 
between emotion and knowledge.”96 Thomas emphasises how we gain knowledge by 
connaturality, how we first learn by our very being, “by receiving and being 
conquered by the object o f our love.”97 Gorevan states that Thomas’s general theory 
of the passions stresses how we can know things more intimately and personally 
through our emotions. For example, Thomas discusses his theory of love in the 
context o f beatitudo, the human desire for the good. This is to be found in his treatise 
entitled “Purpose and Happiness” which as stated earlier will be discussed alongside 
the treatise on “Man”.
96 Gorevan, P. Acta Philosophica, vol.9 (2000). p. 148.
97 Ibid., p. 149.
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The argument for the freedom of the will (liberum arbitrium) is dealt with in the final 
question on the capacities of human beings (ST.la, q.83). But in the first article of 
question eighty two (ST.la, q.82, a .l)  necessity in relation to the will is considered. 
The first type of necessity discussed is that o f coercion -  when someone is physically 
compelled to do something against his or her will; secondly, a type of necessity arises 
from those things necessary for survival -  our basic needs that can also be described 
as utility.98 Thomas employs the concept of the understanding -  how it must o f  
necessity cleave to first principles -  to demonstrate how the will is determined by a 
particular type o f necessity that affects it objectively. The will is determined by its 
goal -  it is not free as to its object, that is, the desire for ultimate fulfilment. While we 
do exercise freedom in choosing the means -  things for the sake o f the end -  we are 
not free in choosing the end. The will is acting for the highest good, as an intellectual 
power it acts in the knowledge that its object is the good.99
Kenny rejects the parallel drawn between the assent o f the intellect to first principles 
to that of the acceptance of values by the will. While he can accept necessity 
following from necessary truths it is not the case that what leads to a necessary end is 
itself necessary. Who decides on what is necessary to achieve happiness? Also, on 
this account necessity and liberty in the will requires a theological context -  Kenny 
states this “was not needed for his account o f necessity and liberty in the intellect.”100 
Pasnau claims we must understand the theory from the most generalised conception of
98 Et haec vocatur necessitas finis, quae interdum etiam utilitas dicitur. ST .la, q.82, a .l. (Responsio).
99 Human understanding has no tendency not to understand objects because it is a tendency to 
understand objects. Human will has no tendency not to make such known goods its objective because it 
consists o f a tendency to make known goodness in things its objective. Summa Theologiae. Vol.Xl. pp. 
218-219 (note a).
100 Kenny, Aquinas on Mind. p. 70.
Necessity and the will
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happiness, referring to the way Thomas “often explains our capacity for free decision 
in terms of our capacity for understanding universals.5,101
Is it the case therefore that given the right information there would be only one course 
of action open to us? Pasnau states we seem to be free only because of our 
ignorance.102 Socrates also believed that all moral failings are the result o f ignorance 
but whereas Socrates denied the possibility of acting against reason, Thomas held the 
view that reason can be influenced by the passions, and that they in turn affect the 
will. What we today describe as weakness o f will is an apt label for acting against 
reason and failing to focus on what is really important. According to Pasnau this 
allows us to maintain Thomas's position that the will is simple attraction, without 
passion or perturbation o f  soul.103 That is the belief that we will experience this sort 
of simple affection if we ever exist as dis-embodied souls. But as Pasnau states 
“having a body changes everything.”104
Freedom and the Will
The argument for freedom of the will is based on the premise that man is a rational 
animal who reasons from experience, acts freely and chooses from several possible 
courses. Thomas argues that human beings have free decision (liberum arbitrium) 
from the very fact that they are rational. Reason as we already noted exerts a causal 
influence on the will but it is through various operations o f the will -  aliquid ex parte
101 Only that which has intellect can act through a free judgement, insofar as it cognises the universal 
nature o f the good, on the basis o f which it can judge that this or that is good. So whenever there is 
intellect there is lfee-decision. (59.3c; See la2ael.2  ad 3) quoted in Pasnau, p. 219.
102 Ibid., p. 217.
103Alio modo significant simplicem affectum, absque passione vel animae concitatione, et sic sunt actus 
voluntatis. ST.la, q.82, a.5 ad 1.
104 Pasnau, p. 243.
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appetitivae105, and intellect -  et aliquid ex parte cognitivae virtutis1 6, that one enjoys 
freedom of decision. It is generally accepted that the term liberum arbitrium is not 
identical to freedom of the will, it refers to a specific act o f the will, that o f choice -  
electio. One author describes it as “the will understood as interwoven with and
107dependent on intellect.”
Pasnau tests his compatabilist reading of Thomas’s theory. This is the view that the 
will is free even if determined by outside factors. Thomas’s third objection (la , q.83,
a .l) argues that God is the cause o f our actions and therefore we are not free in our 
decisions. How can this can be explained in a way that is consistent with our 
freedom? God is the creator and first cause on which both natural and free agents 
depend108 but just as God does not prevent the processes o f nature neither does he 
prevent voluntary action from  being voluntary but rather makes it be precisely this.109
The will is a discerning tool -  it is subject to reason to a certain extent but it is also 
subject to habits and passions (la , q.83, a .l, ad 5) that come to the fore to influence 
whether we follow or reject the dictates o f reason. Pasnau believes that it may seem as 
if  Thomas’s account o f the will appears to intellectualise the will, and is therefore at 
odds with the realities of human nature. But while intellect or reason may guide the 
will, intellect alone does not determine the will. The will is open to the suggestions o f 
the intellect but the latter never necessitates any choice on the part of the will. As a 
contingent power the will must be determined by something external. This concerns
105 ST.la, q.83, a.3. (Responsio).
106 Ibid.
107 Stump, E. “Aquinas’s Account o f Freedom” in Davies, (ed.) Contemporary Philosophical 
Perspectives, p. 286.
108 ST.la, q.83, a.3 ad 3.
109 Ibid.
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the self-movement o f the will and is referred to in the following quotation from
Thomas’s account in De malo — “the w ill’s movement comes directly from  the will and
from  God.”110 Pasnau states that this point is developed at greater length in the De
malo. A distinction is made between the exercise o f the will and how the will is
determined. The will is moved by itself and as previously stated it chooses from a
range of possibilities offered by the intellect -  in this it is said to be determined. But
Thomas refers to what are termed our higher-order volitions, these are our individual
habits or dispositions that influence the outcome of the back and forth exchange
between reason and will, a relationship which can be traced back to God as the first
cause.111 Higher-order volitions help to distinguish between absolute necessity and
conditional necessity. Natural appetites explain absolute necessity -  there is no
question here o f freedom -  plant, animal and man alike must follow the course of
nature to varying degrees. Conditional necessity, while less restrictive requires both
animal and man to behave and react in certain ways. But because man has higher-
order beliefs and desires he makes his own individual choices, human beings
determine their own actions for good or for ill -  “not simply by the brute design o f
112nature and the happenstance o f  events.”
The remaining articles on the question of the freedom of the will are concerned with 
whether to describe free decision as a power and if  it is a power is it an appetitive 
power or a cognitive power? Free decision is categorised as a faculty, named so from 
its activity. It is not a natural tendency as in the assent to self-evident principles, such
110 Pasnau, p. 227. Quoting from (QDM 3.3c).
111 This initial impulse comes from God, who not only creates the human soul but somehow puts the 
soul into motion, beginning the long dialogue between our rational powers. Ibid., p. 230.
112 Ibid., p. 233.
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* * 113as our desire for ultimate happiness. Thomas holds that free decision is an 
appetitive power although judgement and reasoning are cognitive powers. This 
conclusion is reached, according to Kenny114 through Thomas’s appeal to Aristotelian 
analysis o f the key notion o f choice. He agrees with Aristotle that it is an appetitive 
power -  it is a well-advised desire (la , q.83, a.3, responsio).
Concluding remarks
In summary then the will is an inclination, a rational appetite desiring goodness (la , 
q.82, a.l). Intellect presents certain objects or actions to the will as being good; the 
latter in turn is guided by intellect in choosing the good. Everything, plants, inanimate 
objects, animals and human beings, has an inclination to the good according to their 
mode of being. This, in human beings is called rational appetite or the will. Just as the 
will directs the intellect in various ways, the intellect in turn moves the will. In this 
way “the will can be moved to will as distinct from not willing -  the ‘exercise’ o f its 
act; or it can be moved to will this rather than that particular thing -  the ‘specification’ 
of its act.”115 Regarding the exercising of its act the will is free in most instances to 
pursue or to reject a particular object or act but there are situations in which the will 
seems to be overpowered by the intellect. Stump116 cites the example of a prisoner 
who tries to not think about what is happening next door to him where other prisoners 
are being tortured, but their screams force him to think about what he wants to stop 
thinking about. As far as the act is concerned the will wills only what the intellect 
presents at that time. This can at one time be considered good, at another time it may 
be considered not good, “so that there is nothing about them which must constrain the
113 Ea autem ad quae naturaliter inclinamur non subsunt libero arbitrio, sicut dictum est de appetitu 
beatitudinis. ST.la, q.83, a.2. (Responsio).
114 Kenny, Aquinas on Mind. p. 80.
115 Stump, in Davies, (ed.) Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, p. 278.
1,6 Ibid.
will o f any agent always to want them.” But Thomas will say that the will is moved
necessarily in one particular way, that is in our desire for happiness -  beatitudo in this 
life and the vision o f God in the afterlife - a topic which I will attempt to discuss next.
117
117 Ibid., p. 279.
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Happiness
The Treatise on Man (STla, qq.75-83) forms a link between free decision (liberum 
arbitrium) as discussed above and Thomas’s focus on actions that proceed from 
reason and will in the Secunda Pars o f the same. I will attempt to discuss Thomas’s 
treatment of happiness (beatitudo) as outlined in questions 1-5 in the Prima Secundae 
or, the First Part o f the Second Part of the Summa Theologiae (hereafter la2ae, qq.l-
5). This treatise was written in the last years o f Thomas’s life although it is also held 
that Thomas worked on it all his life.118 Evidence for this can be found in Pinckaers’ 
comments on the sources, composition and situation of the treatise.119 Thomas 
discussed happiness in several different works e.g., Pinckaers highlights the
7 'sn t
Commentary on the Sentences and the Summa contra Gentiles in which we are told 
Thomas uses the term felicitas to convey the message that happiness consists wholly 
in the vision of God. These and several other texts address the question o f happiness 
from which Pinckaers states we have a sketch o f Thomas’s treatment o f happiness in 
the Summa.
Pinckaers emphasises the important position given to the treatise on happiness in the 
Summa -  happiness as the last end is also the starting-point for Thomas’s discussion
on morality. The questions, he states, are “not merely a simple preamble to the moral
121section of the work, but form a veritable keystone which dominates the whole.” 
Further he raises the problem of scholars who have separated Thomas’s moral 
theology from his theory on happiness in the mistaken belief that happiness must be
118 Pinckaers, S. “The desire for happiness as a way to God” in Thomas Aquinas -  Approaches to 
Truth, James McEvoy and Michael Dunne, (eds.) Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2002. p. 54.
119 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
120 Ibid., p. 54 “ ...where Peter Lombard studies the final ends and the various degrees o f blessedness 
among the saints, according to Christ’s saying that ‘there are many mansions in [his] Father’s house”.
121 Ibid., pp. 54-55.
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forfeited in order to live according to the moral law. He refers to Immanuel Kant’s 
duty-oriented morality that led to his critique of eudaimonism. Kant (1724-1804) was
199“the first philosopher to put the concept o f ‘duty’ at the very centre o f ethics.” 
Duty, according to Kant is to be “performed entirely for its own sake, not in order to
190
promote human happiness or fulfilment.” According to Norman, Kant’s ethics must 
be examined against the background of eighteenth-century German Protestantism and 
that in contrast to the monastic tradition of “other-worldly asceticism” it is worldly 
activities which “provide the setting in which one is required to exhibit moral 
goodness,”124 thus giving rise to Kant’s stress on duty for duty’s sake.
In examining the rights and wrongs of the human desire for happiness, Thomas wants 
to establish a basis for a moral theory by considering the natural desires o f man, one 
that begins with the individual’s inner being and actions and one that maintains 
Thomas’s position with regard to the unity o f body and soul. The short treatise on 
happiness looks at the pre-moral conditions that we need to consider before acting for
• • 19c
an end and the post-moral condition of being happy with that act. Before entering
19into the treatise proper it might help to use the analogy Pinckaers makes when 
referring to the finality or end involved. The end is compared to a spinal column
197controlling the “structure o f morality” -  a continuous finality rather than the 
disconnectedness o f  any particular aims o f human nature. Thus to begin we will
122 Norman, R. The Moral Philosophers — An Introduction to Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998. p. 71.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 “First settle the can he thinks, then afterwards the ought” . Summa Theologiae. Vol. XVI. 
Introduction and notes by Thomas Gilby. Blackfriars, Cambridge: Eyre and Spottiswoode Limited, 
1969. p. xiv.
126 Pinckaers, p. 57.
127 Ibid.
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understand happiness in the most general light and examine the main tenets o f the 
treatise to reach the particular views held by Thomas.
Sources
The principal sources that Thomas refers to in the question on happiness are taken 
from Scripture and the commentaries of the Fathers, in particular St. Augustine; the 
philosophical sources are Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, the De Anima and 
Boethius’s De Consolatione. Thus we have the teaching on happiness handed down 
by the Christian tradition in the writings o f St. Augustine and Boethius together with 
Aristotle representing the best philosophical tradition. Pinckaers makes the point that 
to understand Thomas’s writing -  characterised by him as “rational precision”, we 
need to be fully acquainted with his sources and to appreciate the emphasis he places 
on the relationship between reason and the powers o f the soul or intellect, as we have 
already seen, and, as we shall see the predominant position he gives to reason in 
regard to faith.
The treatise on happiness begins with the question -  “does acting for an end apply to 
man?” indicating at once the nature of Thomas’s ethics, his teleological view of the 
created world in general and of human nature in particular. One can see the 
comparison with the opening remarks o f Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics -  “Every 
skill and every inquiry, and similarly every action and rational choice, is thought to 
aim at some good;',,m  Aristotle’s view is that everything we do is for the sake o f the 
fulfilled life -  he uses the Greek word eudaimonia which is equivalent to the Latin 
word used by Thomas, beatitudo, meaning blessedness or happiness. Aristotle argues
128 Crisp, R. (ed.) Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge Texts in the History o f Philosophy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. p. 3. (B k.l. ch.i.)
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that happiness is the ultimate end -  chosen only for itself, never for the sake of 
something else. Happiness is also the most complete end and sufficient in itself.
.  1 9 Q  » ■Aristotle’s “function argument” echoes throughout the Summa, particularly in the 
context of the fulfilled and happy life. The argument states that in order to discover 
what fulfilment consists in we must inquire as to its function. For human beings to 
function well is to exercise the capacities or powers found in the human soul -  “a 
human being’s characteristic activity is the exercise o f reason.” Following Aristotle 
Thomas would agree that the intrinsic good o f a human being would involve the 
exercising of reason to the best of their ability. Thomas’s view is that while we can 
achieve happiness in this life by exercising rationality in accordance with the virtues, 
the happiness to be found in the next life needs another kind o f virtue.131
St. Augustine’s first completed work on happiness is De beata vita but “the theme 
turns up in three great works of his maturity (Confessions; Commentary on the 
Psalms; The City o f  God) ” . Thomas’s treatise on happiness opens with the words -
man is made to G od’s image -  conveying something of the “rich theological
1 « • • * • background” of the work which is largely filled in by St. Augustine. His theory of
happiness and the means of attaining it are determined by his Christian faith. An
indication of the esteem in which Thomas held Augustine’s authority and knowledge
can be seen in the many quotations he refers to throughout the treatise -  forty-two
quotations are recorded by Pinckaers.
129Ibid. p. xiii.
130 Ibid.
131 “Aristotle linked all virtues to happiness in this life; Augustine linked them all to happiness in the 
afterlife. Thomas him self argues that humankind has as ends both kinds o f  happiness and so needs two 
kinds of virtue: divinely infused as well as naturally acquired (ST.la,IIae, q.51, a.4).” Kent, B. “Habits 
and Virtues (la2ae, qq. 49-70)” in Pope, p. 118.
132 McEvoy, J. Happiness, Friendship, and the Summum Bonum. Faculty o f Philosophy, Maynooth. p. 
2 .
133 Summa Theologiae. Vol.XVI. p. xvi (note a).
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One example, which is used to consolidate Thomas’s own position is taken from the 
Confessions Book X (Augustine’s account of his search for God) where Augustine 
speaks of happiness as joy in truth.134 In this same article Thomas disagrees with 
Augustine’s position that happiness is an act o f the will. Thomas argues that if  
happiness is a matter o f willing a needy man would straightway have all he wanted 
(la2ae, q.3, a.4). The question as to whether happiness is intellectual or if  it comes 
from the will is discussed at greater length below. But even this scant account o f a 
single article highlights the need for a close reading o f Thomas’s sources and their 
respective backgrounds.
The De Consolatione o f Boethius should also be explored for his theory on happiness 
-  as Pinckaers states such a reading “is practically a necessity if  we are to grasp the
i O r t '
depths and nuances o f Thomas’s problematic.” Anicius Manlius Severinus 
Boethius was bom c.480 into a prominent senatorial family. In 523 he fell from 
favour and was accused o f treason and after a year in prison he was executed under 
the emperor Theodoric the Ostrogoth. It was during his imprisonment that he wrote 
his masterpiece The Consolation o f  Philosophy which had a profound influence 
throughout medieval Europe and still has a unique appeal for the modem reader. 
Boethius relates how Lady Philosophy visited him in prison to offer him her 
consolation and to cure him of his grief. The reader accompanies him on his journey 
to realising that complete happiness is not be found in this life but consists in seeing 
the Good, which is God. Thomas quotes from Books II and III o f the De Consolatione 
re-enforcing his argument that happiness is not to be found in any worldly possessions
134 Secundum quod Augustinus dicit, quod beatitudo est gaudium de veritate\ quia scilicet ipsum 
gaudium est consummatio beatitudinis. ST.la2ae, q.3, a.4. (Responsio).
135 Pinckaers, p. 54.
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and, as Boethius himself had learned, status or power do not help one to achieve 
peace of mind or security. Boethius was an authority on the texts o f both Plato and 
Aristotle and also on Neoplatonism, the De Consolatione would therefore “take up all
* * • • 136the highest ethical and metaphysical developments o f antiquity.” Thomas quotes 
one particular quotation in three separate articles ( la 2ae, q.2, a .l, objection 2) ( la 2ae, 
q.3, a.2, objection 2 & (la2ae,q.3, a.3, objection 2) albeit for different purposes. The 
quotation refers to the way human beings strive in countless and various ways to
1 27reach the common goal o f happiness. But however we envisage the accumulation 
of goods -  wealth, honour, power, glory and pleasure -  he concludes that want in this 
life can never be fully removed.
The Purpose of Human Activity
The first question o f the treatise on happiness asks whether we should speak of man 
acting for an end. According to Thomas every action, whether human, animal or 
inanimate is done for the sake of an end. Animals tend toward it by their natural 
appetite while human beings can knowingly and willingly set themselves in motion
i o o
towards an end. Thomas draws on Aristotle’s authority (T7/?/cv,li.1094a4) that 
actions in themselves can be values, honesta, or pleasurable, delectabilia and 
therefore not just a means, utilia to something else. The Greek word teleios as used by 
Aristotle to describe ends or goals conveys Thomas’s meaning of the end as a good 
that is conceived in the mind. It is translated as that which is complete, final or perfect 
and “the more an end is pursued for its own sake and not for the sake of other ends,
136 McEvoy, p. 6.
137 “It is clear, therefore, that happiness is a state made perfect by the presence o f everything that is 
good, a state, which as we said, all mortal men are striving to reach though by different routes.” 
Boethius, The Consolation o f  Philosophy. Translated by Victor Watts, Penguin Classics, 1995. p. 48. 
(Book III, Ch.,ii).
138 ST.la2ae, q .l, a .l, objection 2.
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the more complete it is.”139 Man differs in this respect from non-intelligent creatures 
in that he is master o f  what he does and necessarily has free decision (liberum 
arbitrium) re-enforcing the conclusion of question eighty-three above.140
In article three of the same question, Thomas, quoting from Augustine -  according as 
their aim is worthy o f  blame or praise so are our deeds worthy o f  blame or praise -  
argues that the end as necessitated by the will determines the nature o f a human act 
but that the act must be evaluated according to the intentions o f the agent. For 
example the taking of a human life, as a physical event is basically always the same, 
yet when considering it as a moral act, the reasons for carrying it out must be taken 
into account, e.g., whether a murder is committed in self-defence or if someone is 
acting to appease his anger.
The end orders mans’ actions in two ways -  the order of intention and the order of 
execution. The end as intention is the essential foundation for any action. As for the 
order o f execution of an act Thomas argues, following Augustine, that there has to be 
one ultimate end. There may be many intermediary ends but the final end sets 
everything in motion -  the end is “the goal to which the goals o f other actions are 
subordinated.”141 All things desire completion, not in the sense that something passes 
away and is no more but that it has reached its fulfilment and wants for nothing
Crisp, p. 208.
140 Ilia ergo quae rationem habent, seipsa movent ad finem: quia habent dominium suorum actuum per 
liberum arbitrium, quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis. ST.la2ae, q .l, a.2. (Responsio).
141 Mclnemy, R. “Ethics”, in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. Kretzmann N. and Stump E. 
(eds.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. p. 199.
142 Oportet igitur quod ultimus finis ita impleat totum hominis appetitum, quod nihil extra ipsum 
appetendum relinquatur. ST. Ia2ae, q .l, a.5. (Responsio).
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The ultimate end is a perfect good which requires intermediate ends -  secondary 
objects o f desire, subordinate to the supreme good but “noble and delightful in 
themselves.”143 Thomas concedes that we are not always consciously aiming towards 
the ultimate end. In this life, we can only act with incomplete certainty in any of our 
actions -  we do not, according to Pasnau “adhere to God himself with complete 
certainty.”144 But there can only be one final end for the individual human being and 
for all human beings.
Thomas speaks of happiness in two ways -  the abstract and the concrete, the former 
refers to the fact that all things strive toward fulfilment, the latter refers to what 
determines the final end. Some want a life o f pleasure, others riches (this is the topic 
of the following question which deals with objective happiness) -  but who decides on 
what constitutes the ultimate end? Using the analogy of the sense o f taste he states 
that agreement can be reached by choosing that which most appeals to cultivated 
tastes. Applying the analogy we should hold that those who live the most moral life 
seek the ultimate end.145 But as Wieland concludes, “this can only apply if  all agree 
on what constitutes the most moral life.”146 Quoting from Augustine in the final 
article of this question Thomas uses the term beatitudo establishing that God is the 
ultimate end for all things without exception. Pinckaers states that the ultimate end 
creates a solidarity between man and other creatures but that man differs in that he 
can know and love God, animals only know after their fashion.147
143 Summa Theologiae. Vol.XVI. p. 145.
144 Pasnau, p. 218.
145 Et similiter illud bonum oportet esse completissimum quod tanquam ultimum finem appetit habens 
affectum bene dispositum. ST.la2ae, q .l, a.7. (Responsio).
146 Wieland, G. “Happiness (la Ilae, qq. 1-5)” in Pope (ed.) p. 58.
147 Nam homo et aliae rationales creaturae consequuntur ultimum finem cognoscendo et amando 
Deum: quod non competit aliis creaturis, quae adipiscuntur ultimum finem inquantum participant 
aliquam similitudinem Dei, secundum quod sunt, vel vivunt, vel etiam cognoscunt. ST.la2ae, q .l, a.8. 
{Responsio).
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Objective Happiness
Pinckaers develops his analogy o f the pathway to God -  the right side of a column or 
path represents the objective side o f happiness and this is dealt with in the second 
question of Thomas’s treatise on happiness. The form of the question is negative as 
Pinckaers states, in that articles 1 -4 state that happiness is not to be found in external 
goods such as riches, honours, fame and glory; nor in the internal endowments such as 
health, knowledge or virtue as stated in articles 5-7; the final article is the culmination 
of the question stating that man’s happiness cannot be realised in any created good but 
it is God alone who brings complete happiness to man.
In the sed contra of article 1 Thomas appeals to Boethius as the authoritative view 
quoting from the De Consolatione which states that amassing wealth is hateful, 
whereas to be generous, largitas, is splendid. He divides riches into two classes, 
natural and artificial. Natural riches are there to sustain us -  food, clothing etc., 
artificial riches are those which are above and beyond our ordinary needs. Wealth is a
1 48means, never an end -  let alone the final end as Wieland states. In support of his 
argument that possessions only bring temporary happiness Thomas quotes from 
Scripture (John 4:13) Whosoever drinks o f  this water, which signifies temporal 
benefits, will thirst again. Political achievements that bring honour, glory and fame 
satisfy the natural desire for happiness but do not constitute happiness itself. Honour 
is due to a person for an excellence which he has in his character or for an action 
heroically performed but it must be viewed as a mark of recognition and confirmation 
of worthiness by the wise and experienced. Honour, Aristotle states in the Ethics,149
l4S Wieland, p. 60.
149£^ic i,l,5 .1095b24.
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seems to belong more to those who honour than to the person honoured.150 Even less 
value is attributed to fame and glory, which according to Boethius, can often be the 
result of lying reports broadcast to the multitude (la2ae, q.2, a.3, responsio). They 
depend on human estimation and are therefore subject to error and illusion.151 Fame is 
usually short-lived, whereas happiness beatitudo essentially remains forever. 
Likewise power can be used for good or for evil, it is “morally ambivalent, and
• • 152dependent upon virtue for its good use.”
Each of the external goods can be present both in a good or a bad man whereas 
beatitudo is complete well-being, incompatible with any evil. The very nature o f 
beatitudo implies self-sufficiency and according to Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics 
Bk.l.ch.7.1097b) “we take what is self-sufficient to be that which on its own makes 
life worthy of choice and lacking in nothing.”153 Even with all o f the above a person 
may still be wanting in many indispensable gifts, such as wisdom, health o f  body and 
so forth  (la2ae, q.2, a.4, responsio). And although the latter are likewise fleeting and 
short-lived they are rated more highly than wealth and ownership of property just as 
the welfare o f the soul is rated more highly than that o f the body (la2ae, q.2, a.5). 
Lastly pleasure and desire, the pleasures of the senses are considered. Boethius speaks 
of pleasures in terms of excesses that cannot render a person happy since in this 
respect the very beasts are happy too (la2ae, q.2, a.6, sed contra). The good that is 
connected to bodily pleasure is not m an’s full good -  it is neither the heart nor an 
essential property of happiness. Thomas employs the distinction between the sense
150 ST.la2ae, q.2, a.2. {Sed Contra).
151 Est etiam aliud considerandum, quod humana notitia saepe fallitur, et praecipue in singularibus 
contingentibus, cujusmodi sunt actus humani. Et ideo frequenter humana gloria fallax est. ST.la2ae, 
q.2, a.3. {Responsio).
152 McEvoy, p .8. Happiness, Friendship and the Summum Bonum.
153 Quoted in Crisp, (ed.) Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, p. IE
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capacities of the individual and the universality o f spiritual knowledge; spiritual 
things are unbounded compared with material things.154 Wieland concludes that what 
Thomas wants to show is that the desires of the body cannot encompass the 
immensity and universality o f human fulfilment.155 That being the case the next 
article ( la 2ae, q.2, a.7) addresses the question as to whether a good quality of soul 
makes a man’s happiness. For Thomas something that is in potentiality cannot be the 
final end; therefore the soul, itself a potentiality, cannot have the force o f an ultimate 
end. Although we do gain or possess the good by means o f the soul and its capacities, 
desire cannot be completely fulfilled in this life. Happiness is a good o f the soul in 
that it seeks happiness through the soul’s activities and powers and is therefore 
founded on a thing outside o f soul.156
The fact that there is nothing in the created world that can completely satisfy man’s 
will and desire can be seen in the universal desire to know the first cause -  nor shall 
we come to rest until we come to see the cause fo r  what it really is -  (la2ae, q.3, a.8, 
responsio). Even if  we knew no more about God but that he exists we would still have 
a natural desire to find him. To reach complete happiness requires the mind to come
157through to the essence itself o f  the first cause.
154 Sicut immaterialia sunt quodammodo infinita respectu materialium, eo quod forma per materiam 
quodammodo contrahitur et finitur, unde forma a materia absoluta est quodammodo infmita. ST.la2ae, 
q.2, a.6. {Responsio).
155 Wieland, p. 61.
156 Ad tertium dicendum quod beatitudo ipsa, cum sit perfectio animae, est quoddam animae bonum 
inhaerens: sed id in quo beatitudo consistit, quod scilicet beatum facit, est aliquid extra animam, ut 
dictum est. ST.la2ae, q.2, a.7 ad 3.
157 Et sic perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad objectum, in quo solo beatitudo 
hominis consistit, ut supra dictum est. ST.la2ae, q.3, a.8. {Responsio).
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Subjective Happiness
Returning to Pinckaer’s analogy -  the left of the column or the path to God is 
concerned with “the action o f the person who is following it, and principally with the 
intellect, which grasps the good and presents it to the will.” 58 This represents the 
subjective aspect o f happiness which asks that we conceive o f the final end in a 
spiritual sense, transcending all reality in order to reach God. In this sense the essence 
of happiness is non-creaturely (la2ae, q.3, a .l) but for man to make the ascent 
involves much striving on his part.
Clearly man strives for happiness through many activities. Man is in potentiality 
throughout his life, actively involved in various occupations. But happiness is gained 
when man enters eternal life as the quote from Scripture (John 17:3) tells us -  This is 
eternal life, that they may know thee, the only true God (la2ae, q.3, a.2, ad 1). 
Accordingly there are various degrees of perfection -  God is the highest and absolute 
perfection of being, his very existence is his happiness. Happiness, in the case o f 
angels is the simple and everlasting activity joining them to God. Angels possess 
uninterrupted happiness whereas man’s happiness is incomplete and, quoting from 
Aristotle he sums up the argument -  We call them happy, but only as men (la2ae, q.3,
a.2, ad 4). Wieland interprets Thomas as saying that if  we take God to be the highest 
standard and if  we measure the various levels o f happiness against God’s attributes of 
simplicity, actuality and absolute completion, on the one hand “the most complete 
human activity proves to be deficient to such a degree that complete happiness only 
appears as divine promise, but not as human achievement;” 159 on the other hand as
158 Pinckaers, pp. 58-59.
159 Wieland, p. 62.
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mortals we share in God’s lasting unity, the more we search for the truth the more our 
lives will take on the sense of continuity that is found in the angels and in God.
Sensitive activity is not a constituent of happiness but enters into beatitudo as it does 
with the intellect (la , q.78) i.e., as an antecedent it prepares the mind and is 
preliminary to understanding; as a consequent, sensation can share in an overflow o f 
joy from the soul to the body i.e., the perfect happiness to be found in heaven. 
Thomas, following Augustine states that the senses -  the body -  will be reunited to 
the soul for the Final Judgement (la2ae, q.3, a.3, responsio) but he also speaks of 
being united with God in a way which does not depend on the senses.160
According to Thomas happiness is an activity of the intellect, not o f the will as 
Augustine held (la2ae, q.3, a.4). As stated by Thomas in the sed contra -  happiness is 
knowing God, which is an activity o f  mind, it can only consist in an act o f reason. 
Thomas argues that the will is either striving after an end that is not yet attained or the 
will is delighting in the fact that it has achieved its end, the delight being a 
consequence of this achievement.161 This leads into the debate between Thomists and 
Scotists, the latter emphasising the will as desire. Both accounts have their respective 
followers and as Gilby states some questions, the present one among them -  whether 
happiness is intellectual or whether it comes from the will -  are not just for a period, 
but perennial.162 Thomas insists that knowledge must be present if  we are to know 
love but he also states that love ranks above knowledge as an impulse but in order to 
have a deep and lasting love some activity o f  mind is also required (la2ae, q.3, a.5, ad
160 Non autem tunc operatio qua mens humana Deo conjungetur, a sensu dependebit. ST.la2ae, q.3, 
a.3. (Responsio).
,61Sic igitur essentia beatitudinis in actu intellectus consistit, sed ad voluntatem pertinet delectatio 
beatitudinem consequens; ST.la2ae, q.3, a.4. (Responsio).
162 Summa Theologiae. Vol. XVI. p. 152.
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4). While both Thomas and Duns Scotus agree that the act o f understanding is 
certainly prior to the will it is the fact that the will is determined by nothing other than 
itself that brings about a total freedom of the will for Scotus and for the first time the 
position known as voluntarism is held by subsequent authors. In his writing Cross 
expresses the opinion that there is much to be said in favour o f Thomas’s account but 
equally the account Scotus gives for the will and for wrong-doing seem very 
plausible.163 Scotus held that in addition to its natural inclination the will has an 
inclination to justice, called respectively the affectio commodi (affection for the 
beneficial or advantageous) and the affectio iustitiae (the affection for justice).164 The 
former seeks self-fulfilment in beatitudo, the latter in justice. To say that the will is 
solely directed to the attainment of beatitudo is not according to Scotus conducive to 
freedom. He argues that it cannot be that the will automatically wills happiness as this 
would “automatically constrain the intellect to consider happiness all the time.”165 The 
affectio iustitiae, because it is distinguished from the natural inclination to the good 
allows for a genuine freedom of the will according to Scotus. His account allows for 
the fact that the will modifies its natural bent and for the fact that we can be driven by 
something other than the natural inclination to will beatitudo.
Something similar can be identified in Thomas’s account of the will when it is moved 
necessarily in its natural inclination for goodness which is “overwhelmingly apparent 
to the agent.”166 When the end can only be attained in one way -  Stump167 refers to 
the example o f when crossing the sea requires using a ship (la , q.82, a .l, responsio) -
163 Cross, R. Duns Scotus. New York / Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. p. 85.
164 Ibid., p. 87
165 Ibid.
166 Stump, E. “Aquinas’s Account of Freedom” in Davies, B. (ed.) Thomas Aquinas -  Contemporary 
Philosophical Perspectives, p. 288.
167 Ibid.
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natural necessity is not incompatible with willing. Also Thomas is not saying that we 
act immorally due to mistakes in deliberation. His account is much more complicated 
according to Stump168 who offers one instance in Thomas’s account which allows for 
the fact that the will can deliberately go against its natural inclination. In a case o f 
incontinence where the intellect is presenting something as good but the will is not 
willing; intellect is being moved by opposing desires -  the object in question is 
represented as both good and not good. She refers us to Thomas’s account in the 
Summa (la2ae, q.17, a.2, and a.5, ad 1) in which he describes the intellect as “double- 
minded”. Equally the author refers to the case in which an individual may have to 
choose from a number o f options but in such cases there must be considerable 
interaction between the intellect, the will, the passions and as she concludes this is a 
situation familiar to anyone who has had to force themselves into doing something 
which he/she originally feared or disliked.
Regarding the contrast between the intellectualism o f Thomas and the voluntarism of 
Scotus, Gilby states that it would be “somewhat misleading if  one side suggests cold 
thinking and the other warm feeling.”169 According to him, the issue is not whether 
the intellect is superior to the emotions but which is the most dominant in achieving 
beatitudo.
The intellect, man’s highest power functions at two levels according to Thomas -  the 
speculative or theoretical level and the practical level. This distinguishes the activity 
of contemplation that is sought for it’s own sake from the practical reasoning that is 
designed for an end. The latter could be described as causality in the mental sphere,
168 Ibid., pp. 280-1.
169 Summa Theologiae. Vol.XVI. p. 151.
61
the practical activities of the mind; whereas contemplation brings man closer to God 
and the angels, it is that which is best in him (Aristotle’s Ethics ix, 8 & x.7. 1169a2 
&1178a2). This was an important question in the thirteenth century as it refers back to 
the controversy between Thomas and Latin Averroism. Bonino states that Aristotle 
distinguished between the theoretical and practical life in Book X of the Nicomachean
• » 1 7 0Ethics conveying an “exaltation of the theoretical life.” But for Thomas 
philosophical contemplation alone cannot be man’s ultimate end. The imperfect 
beatitudo we can have in this life is primarily centred on contemplation and in a 
secondary sense on the activity of the practical intelligence governing our deeds and 
feelings.171 Thomas, elaborating on the mind’s assent to beatitudo, argues that the 
theoretical sciences which study the material world do so through the senses and 
therefore cannot provide man’s ultimate happiness -  we cannot rise to a direct 
knowledge o f  bodiless substance (la2ae, q.3, a.6). Even the angels, as bodiless 
substances have derivative existence, it is God alone whose existence is his essence. 
Angels are far superior to us and as ministers o f God can help man to know God 
(la2ae, q.3, a.7); we can contemplate on the angels as a part o f being but not as m an’s 
final goal. Intellect can only know fulfilment when it knows -  what really is (la2ae, 
q.3, a.8) i.e., the essence o f a thing. Thus man seeks to know not only that God is the 
first cause o f the world but also to know the essence o f the first cause.
170 Bonino, Serge-Thomas. “Charisms, Forms, and States o f Life (Ilallae, qq 171-189)” in Pope (ed.) p. 
345.
171 Et ideo ultima et perfecta beatitudo, quae expectatur in futura vita, tota principaliter consistit in 
contemplatione. Beatitudo autem imperfecta, qualis hie haberi potest, primo quidem et principaliter 
consistit in contemplatione; secundario vero in operatione practici intellectus ordinantis actiones et 
passiones humanas, ut dicitur in Ethic. ST.la2ae, q.3, a.5. (Responsio).
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Question four deals with the conditions o f happiness -  in what does happiness 
consist? Happiness cannot exist without joy or delight -  the two are related as 
Wieland states like cause and effect.172 The will finds rest in an activity because it 
sees good in the activity, delight follows from this but it is not what forms the nature 
of the activity. Delight, as we understand it, is a consequence o f happiness; the 
rightness or wrongness of the actions revolve around the activity in which the will 
finds rest, and not the actual resting because o f  it (la2ae, q.4, a.2, responsio). But 
cause and effect coincide in the delight that follows the vision o f God, since happiness 
exists essentially in seeing God. Comprehension is another condition o f happiness 
(la2ae, q.4, a.3). It is required by the intellect since the latter has only an incomplete 
knowledge of the end and it is also required by the will since comprehension also 
refers to that which is striven after. The will is expressed in terms o f the lover seeking 
the beloved and the various experiences involved, e.g., happiness can be expressed as
• 173a feeling of hope just as the lover hopes that the beloved may yet be reached. 
Rightness of will or living a good life is an antecedent condition o f happiness. It is 
compared to an arrow that has to be accurately flighted to hit the target (la2ae, q.4,
a.4, ad 2). Rightness o f will is an attendant condition o f  fina l happiness which is 
linked to the beatific vision of God (la2ae, q.4, a.2, responsio). It is the cause of 
man’s acting out o f love within the notion o f goodness in general. Rightness o f will 
according to Wieland implies nothing other than the suitable orientation to the end.174
The Conditions of Happiness
172 Wieland, p. 64.
173Et haec est habitudo sperantis ad speratum, quae sola habitudo facit finis inquisitionem. ST.la2ae, 
q.4, a.3. (Responsio).
174 Wieland, p. 64.
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Thomas develops his earlier treatment of the immortality of the soul (la , q.75, a.2) -  
that while neither the soul or the body could exist without the other in this our earthly 
existence it is not so with the beatific vision. Since it excludes all sense mediation the 
beatific vision does not require the body -  the soul subsists in its existing (la2ae, q.4,
a.5, ad 2). In reply to St. Augustine’s remark that the soul still craves the body 
Thomas distinguishes between the disembodied soul as wholly at rest because it has 
attained the object of its desires, and the subject, the individual human being, which 
has not as yet reached every perfection o f happiness, the good is not possessed in 
every manner that can be wished fo r  (la2ae, q.4, a.5, ad 5), although Thomas states 
that some souls do acquire the status o f angels.175 This brings us back to the question 
raised by Pasnau as to what happens to the separated soul and body between death 
and the Resurrection and to his concern that the separated soul is not the “I” that 
existed for a certain period of time as a human being. Pasnau resolves the latter 
problem by subscribing to Thomas’s metaphysical account o f matter and form, o f a 
human being as a composite of body and soul, an unum simpliciter (la , q.76, a .l, ad
6) and as inseparable in this our mortal life. Thus the separated soul cannot possibly 
be the whole human being.176 It is matter individuating the form that gives each of us 
our personal identity both in this life and in the next; as Pasnau states “sameness o f 
body is accounted for in terms of sameness in form.”177 However, the resurrected 
body is not the same corruptible body of this world but what Thomas refers to as the
175 ....quia etiam modo aliquae animae beatorum sunt assumptae ad superiores ordines angelorum, 
clarius videntes Deum quam inferiores angelí. ST.la2ae, q.4, a.5 ad 6.
176 “Abraham’s soul is not, strictly speaking, Abraham himself; it is rather a part o f  him (and so too for 
others). So Abraham’s soul having life would not suffice for Abraham’s being alive...The life o f the 
whole compound is required: soul and body (IV S E N T 43.1.1.1 ad 2; see 2a2ae 83.11 obj. 5 & ad 5)” -  
quoted in Pasnau, p. 386.
177 Ibid., p. 393.
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immortal body.178 This follows Augustine’s explanation o f the soul overflowing into 
the body and allowing the body to participate in its happiness and perfection -  God 
made soul o f  so potent a nature that from  its brimming happiness the strength o f  
incorruption flow s into lower nature (la2ae, q.4, a.6, responsio). As Wieland 
concludes “in this the body participates in its own way in the fullness o f divine 
wealth”179. In its spiritual existence the body does not require external goods, since 
our bodies are no longer animal but spiritual (la2ae, q.4, a.7, responsio). Although 
we do require external goods throughout our mortal lives, yet, as we draw closer to 
God in the contemplative life we become less dependent on those goods. In the final 
article on the conditions o f happiness Thomas agrees with Aristotle that we need 
friends for many reasons, that we may do good for them and delight in the fact that 
they also do good but primarily friends will give support in both the active and 
contemplative life. Augustine believes that there is friendship among spiritual 
creatures but that the nature of their friendship is deepened because it also implies 
friendship with God.
178 Ad tertium dicendum quod ad perfectam operationem intellectus requiritur quidem abstractio ab hoc 
corruptibili corpore, quod aggravat animam; non autem a corpore spirituali, quod erit totaliter spiritui 
subjectum, de quo in Tertia Parte huius operis dicetur. ST.la2ae, q.4, a.6 ad 3.
179 Wieland, p. 64.
The critical factors for happiness are the intellect and the will which apprehend and 
grasp the universal good. But the final question o f the treatise which discusses the 
means to gaining happiness raises the difficulty as to how we, as human beings can 
understand the supernatural. Gilby explains that in one sense the life o f grace is
supernatural to man because it belongs to the Divine, but understood in another sense
• 180 -  that we as human beings have the capacity “to be acted on by grace” may help to
explain the possibility, not the fact o f the divine vision. Wieland also argues for the
* * * 181 “fundamental openness or receptivity o f the person for the infinite essence o f God.”
He states that if  this were not the case it would mean that the individual who strives
for the good in this life would be essentially a different person in eternity. The
question of human openness to God leads to Thomas’s statement that there are
various degrees o f happiness in this life. The more open a person is to receiving God
the more he can be said to share in the infinite goodness of God.
Following Augustine Thomas lists the imperfections o f our lives on earth -  
unavoidable ills, ignorance of our minds, bodily pain, and all the familiar things that 
can be our lot and yet it is our nature to grasp at life and to shrink from  death ( la 2ae, 
q.5, a.3, responsio). Life as we experience it, Wieland concludes cannot “fulfil the 
human desire for longevity and reliability.”182 We cannot reach anything like a vision 
of God in this life but we can experience reflections of true beatitude (la2ae, q.5, a.3, 
ad 3). The partial happiness o f this life can be lost and as Aristotle states, we are 
happy -  as men are, whose nature is subject to change (la2ae, q.5, a.4, responsio).
180 Summa Theologiae. Vol.XVI. p. 119.
181 Wieland, p. 65.
182 Ibid.
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Happiness in the next life is a state free from evil or fear o f losing this good. No one 
would relinquish his happiness when it has been found, as it is what the will 
necessarily desires. The mind is so raised above all other things (la2ae, q.5, a.4, 
responsio) that no force or external factor can threaten this happiness.
Man cannot attain complete happiness through his natural resources (la2ae, q.5, a.5). 
This is not to be regarded as a failing on the part o f nature, since man has been 
granted intellect and its powers, and also free-decision. In this he is free to choose or 
reject the path to God. Nor can man come to happiness through the action o f superior 
or angelic creatures whose abilities and activities are limited. While angels can assist 
human beings -  by bringing them into readiness (la2ae, q.5, a.6, ad 1) -  the ultimate 
end comes from the first cause which is God.183 The penultimate article asks whether 
good deeds are required in order to gain happiness from God. Human beings gain 
happiness through their activities which are termed “merits” and agreeing with 
Aristotle Thomas regarded happiness as the reward for virtuous acts carried out 
through the proper disposition o f the will.
Thomas concludes his treatise on happiness with the question as to whether every
i o4
human being desires happiness. Augustine is cited as the authority and in the sed 
contra Thomas concludes that everyone in fact, desires to be happy. While we all 
desire happiness in what is called the abstract sense o f happiness, not everyone 
agrees, as we have discussed earlier, where this happiness lies, i.e., the concrete sense 
of happiness. In the first sense the will tends by nature and o f necessity but in the
183 Ad tertium dicendum quod angélus beatus illuminât intellectum hominis, vel etiam inferioris angeli, 
quantum ad aliquas rationes divinorum operum non autem quantum ad visionem divinae essentiae, ut 
in Primo dictum est. ST.la2ae, q.5, a.6 ad 3.
184 Si minus dixisset, “Omnes beati esse vultis, miseri esse non vultis”, dixisset aliquid quod nullus in 
sua non cognosceret volúntate. ST. Ia2ae, q.5, a.8. (S e d contra).
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second sense an error in reasoning may lead some either to think things are true which 
in fa c t are barriers to knowing the truth (la2ae, q.5, a.8, ad 3) or perhaps, it is stated 
in the reply, they do not know about the object which gathers all good together.
Concluding remarks
Thomas argues that everything tends o f its nature to the good, which philosophically
can be understood as man’s final cause. The final cause answers the question as to
what motivates us to do anything? Because we have a goal or a meaningful purpose in
view of which we live and love and hold our beliefs. As to the question o f the
material cause, the search for happiness in material or created goods, Thomas sets out
to show that man is capable of extending himself beyond created goods. If man seeks
fulfilment in material goods he is compromising himself since he can reach out to the
infinite (la2ae, q.2, a.8, ad 3). The form al cause of happiness, beatitudo formalis is
the acquisition and possession of the object o f happiness, beatitudo objectiva. In the
present life we can only achieve incomplete happiness and this is done through the
“possessing” activity which is contemplation. Possession is explained as visualisation
of the end, it is the delight that accompanies the beatific vision. The efficient cause or
how happiness is gained lies in the vision o f God, a person is “by nature able to
1 • •possess the infinite good” but this is given to us as a gift from God and with it 
certain responsibilities.
According to Gilby186 utilitarianism can be contrasted with Thomas’s ethical theory in 
that it too is a fonn of the ideological theories found in ethics; utilitarianism shares 
the common ground that all action is for the sake of some end. The most well known
185 Wieland, p. 67.
186 Summa Theologiae. Vol.XVI. p. 147.
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utilitarian of the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) defines 
utilitarianism as...
“The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness 
Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong 
as they tend to produce the reverse o f happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the 
absence o f pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation o f pleasure.” 187
But a distinction that is found in Thomas’s ethics is that man is ordered to an end 
other than himself while the doctrine o f utilitarianism refers to something created and 
is dependent on the judgement o f man and therefore limited and subject to error.
Agreeing with Thomas, Maritain states, “the greatness o f man consists in the fact that
• * 188 his sole end is the uncreated good.” As a theologian and a Christian philosopher
Thomas locates happiness in God who is to be loved for his own sake, a theme which,
as we have seen runs throughout the treatise on happiness. And according to a more
recent study of Thomas’s theological ethics “that in which beatitude consists is
189something extra a n i m a m not any created good. When Thomas speaks o f God as 
object, objectum, we must understand it in the medieval sense, not in a modem sense 
that requires us to attribute meaning or significance to it. In the pre-modem sense, 
according to the author the object “is that which attracts the attention of the human 
being -  evoking or provoking, focusing or occluding, this or that act o f reasoning or 
choosing.”190 The uncreated good which Thomas speaks o f is beatitudo, the love of
187 Mill, J.S. “In Defense o f Utilitarianism” . Reprinted from M ill’s Utilitarianism  (1863) in Timmons, 
M. (ed.) Conduct and Character: Readings in Moral Theory, Third Edition. Canada: Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, 1999. p. 115.
188 Maritain, J. An Introduction to Philosophy. London: Sheed and Ward, 1930. p. 204.
189 Kerr, F. After Aquinas -  Versions ofThomism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002. p. 129.
190 Ibid., p. 130.
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God which is unique and according to Gilby’ “it is not God alone whom we love, but 
God above all.”191
191 Summa Theologiae. Vol. XVI. p. 148.
70
It is clear from the treatises on human nature and on happiness that will and intellect 
are the keys to Thomas’s ethics and that they are intimately linked when it comes to 
human actions. The will has free decision (liberum arbitrium) because the intellect 
has power over itself in that it possesses the capacity to reason. But this capacity has 
two aspects, the subjective and the objective. The good that I desire is subjective, 
whatever I desire may or may not be desirable but I am free to follow or reject my 
own reason. However, total happiness, the object, is what the will necessarily wills 
and in this respect, according to Thomas we are not masters o f our desire for ultimate 
happiness.
Both treatises describe a movement from exterior things to the interior to the superior. 
Thus man as a composite o f body and soul receives sense impressions as the primary 
source o f knowledge but it is through the intellect that man transcends the physical.
• • • « 109As a rational animal man seeks the truth which is the formal object o f the intellect,
• » 1QTfor Thomas the intellect is defined by its relation to truth. The same movement 
applies in the case of morality when the will tends toward an object that is presented 
to it by intellect; this is the source o f free decision. But what makes us happy is not to 
be found in external wealth, political achievements, power or any bodily attributes 
such as health, beauty and strength, not even in what in a modem sense is called the 
self. It is only by constant striving on our part that we learn to choose the particular 
goods that will lead us to our ultimate end which consists in God alone.
Conclusions regarding both human nature and beatitudo
192 Lebech, M. Life o f  the Mind -  Lecture notes -  1st Semester 2002, Faculty o f  Philosophy, Maynooth.
193 Sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum nominat id in quod tendit intellectus. 
ST.la, q. 16, a .i. (Responsio).
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The problem of morality as Gilson states is “how to determine the particular goods we 
should choose, and, knowing them, how to determine our acts in view of these 
ends.”194 In his treatise on happiness Thomas answers the fundamental question that 
comes before any other i.e., in what consists the last end o f man. For Thomas man’s 
last end is a supernatural good, the beatific vision is reached, not through the 
imperfect knowledge o f this world but is to be found in the teachings o f Revelation. 
Thomas is writing in the Summa Theologiae as a Christian theologian and for this 
reason some scholars have argued that his philosophical standing is compromised 
since his writing is greatly inspired by the Bible and the authority of the Church. 
Kenny defends Thomas against the allegation that he (Thomas) is “looking for good 
reasons for what he already believes in.”195 As Kenny states Descartes could also be 
accused of writing under similar circumstances and that Bertrand Russell’s criticism 
does not hold sway either since he “in the book Principia Mathematica takes 
hundreds of pages to prove that two and two make four, which is something he had 
believed all his life.”196
The theory that man’s ultimate end consists in the vision o f God has also been 
questioned. In his paper Alan Donagan197 discusses Thomas’s natural law theory and 
discusses it in the context of a natural end and the use to which Thomas employs it in 
his ethical theory. Thomas, according to Donagan, defines a lie as speech that is 
contrary to the speaker’s mind and he quotes from the Summa Theologiae, 11-11,110,3;
194 Gilson, E. History o f  Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. London: Sheed and Ward, 1955. p. 
379.
195 Kenny, Aquinas on Mind. p. 11.
196 Ibid., p. 12.
197 Donagan, A. “The Scholastic Theory o f Moral Law in the M odem World” in Kenny, A. (ed.) 
A q u in a s-A  Collection o f  Critical Essays. London / Melbourne: Macmillan, 1969. pp. 325-339.
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...since words are naturally signs o f  thoughts, it is unnatural and wrong fo r  anyone 
by speech to signify something he does not have in his mind.
Donagan expresses concern over the fact that Thomas’s argument presupposes the 
principle of a natural end and further he does not agree with Thomas’s statement that 
speech is related to the alleged end o f expressing what is in the speaker’s mind. But if  
we apply Thomas’s teleological theory, that the goal or aim o f an action or a thought 
is what is paramount then perhaps we can appreciate Thomas’s argument. If I tell a lie 
because I believe someone’s life is in danger, that is, if  I know that morally I am 
acting for the right reason obviously this is different to my telling a deliberate lie 
which may cause hurt or cause harm to someone. We cannot omit the many powers o f 
the soul when trying to interpret the statement in question; mind as we have seen must 
be viewed in its wider context. Donagan suggests that we can accept Thomas’s 
account if  we apply Kant’s principle -  that “man, and in general every rational being, 
exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that 
will” and he continues that since this implies that if  man is so ordered, “it must be in a 
way consistent with his nature as an end.”
A further explanation for the presupposition o f the end in Thomas’s account is found 
in Alasdair MacIntyre’s discussion on truth as a good.199 Thomas’s account o f the end 
in his treatise on happiness is comparable to the movement o f the mind to achieve 
truth. His conception of the truth as a good must be understood within his wider 
teleological account. Only then, according to MacIntyre can we understand that 
human beings are characteristically seeking the meaning o f the good and also o f
198 Ibid., p. 337.
199 MacIntyre, A. “Truth as a good: a reflection on Fid.es et ratio," in McEvoy & Dunne (eds.) 
Approaches to Truth, pp. 141-157.
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truth.200 In his writing on truth as a good MacIntyre refers to Pope John Paul’s 
encyclical -  Fides et Ratio in which he states that the autonomy of philosophy is “no
♦ » ♦ 901more or no less the autonomy of the enquiring human being.” As individual human 
beings we each seek meaning in our lives guided by reason but also in the knowledge 
that as human beings we are subject to emotions and human desires, experiences in 
which reason cannot always prevail.
The presupposition of truth as the constitutive o f our good is according to MacIntyre 
this “inescapable presupposition that commits us to acknowledgment o f the autonomy
909 • • •of philosophy.” Philosopher and theologian alike seek the truth; as a theologian 
Thomas defended Divine revelation, as a philosopher he sought the truth without 
appealing to Divine revelation. Thomas’s writing is testament to the fact, as stated by 
MacIntyre, that revelation can inform philosophical enquiry and in this regard Fides 
et Ratio “gives it an added significance as so central to human nature that, when that 
nature is transformed by grace through faith, it does not and should not cease to
909 • • •question.” Pasnau likewise endorses the view that Thomas brings together the tasks 
of both philosophy and theology -  “Aquinas’s focus is theological, as he conceives o f 
that, but it is for this very reason also philosophical, as we conceive o f that. His view 
that final causality gives shape to human nature provides a rationale and a sample o f 
why theology for him is continuous with philosophy for us.”204
Thomas’s treatise on human nature discusses man as he is in himself, created by God; 
the treatise on happiness marks the journey o f man as he returns to his creator; both
200 Ibid., p. 155.
201 Ibid., p. 156.
202 Ibid.
203
Pasnau, p. 22.
Ibid.
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treatises reflecting Thomas’s belief that what we can say about God depends on what 
can be said about man who is a “compact o f natural claims and o f supernatural needs
205 *for grace and mercy.” Thomas, as a theologian can make that real connection 
between the natural and the supernatural. But do we not already get a glimpse o f it 
when we witness the goodness in human nature, in those who sacrifice their lives to 
help others, in the extraordinary strength o f those who survive injustice and forgive 
the perpetrators?
Any moral theory worth the name must take account of the darker side of human 
nature which was evident during Thomas’s lifetime no less than it is at the present 
time. Already the first years o f the twenty first century have witnessed horrors such as 
September 11, 2001 and the subsequent paranoia and fear that it has engendered 
throughout the world. At present we are receiving daily news from Iraq, the Middle 
East and the Sudan reporting some o f the worst cruelties and injustices ever 
imaginable and even closer to home we have problems o f addiction and the growing 
number of suicides among young people. It is certainly a sign of the times when we 
look at the rise in the number of people seeking help from psycho-therapists and 
counsellors. But on the positive side we are witnessing a corresponding increase in an 
awareness of the spiritual dimension in our nature, a dimension which must be 
explored if  we are to live life to the full. Spirituality is described as “theological 
psychology” and, although Thomas would not have used the term in the modem 
sense yet there is a connection to be found in his writing if  one considers spirituality 
as “a pattern o f belief stimulated by one’s own times.”207 Thus spirituality must not be
205 Summa Theologiae. Vol.XVI. p. 1.
206 O ’Meara, T.F. Thomas Aquinas -  Theologian. Notre Dame / London: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1997. p. 211.
207 Ibid.
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considered as separated from theology -  “healthy theology overflows into spirituality
90ftand vice versa.” Thomas’s treatment of the human person as made in the image and 
likeness of God is deeply spiritual, both body and soul “contribute to make ethical 
decisions and to living a spiritual life.”209
Thomas’s spiritual writings attracted many followers in the centuries after his death, 
including the philosopher Edith Stein (1891-1942), the youngest daughter o f a large 
Jewish family who converted to Catholicism in 1922 and from that time on she 
focused her philosophical reading upon the medieval scholastic writers, in particular 
Thomas and John Duns Scotus. Thomas’s spiritual theology can be seen in Stein’s 
account of value in the person. As far as Stein is concerned we see “what the person is 
when we see which world o f value she lives in, which values she is responsive to, and 
what achievements she may be creating, prompted by values.”210 Thus for Stein a 
person’s character is formed according to their response to values, a topic which she 
develops in her treatise “Individual and Community”211 in which she gives priority to 
the emotions in stating that emotion “is a ‘being closer’ that pertains to a person
919 • •proper” -  a position which may have been influenced by Scotus’s account o f the 
emotions in ethical matters. Spirit for Stein is real and present when we share 
meaning, it is ...
208 Ibid., p. 212.
209 Ibid., p. 214.
210 Stein, E. Philosophy o f  Psychology and the Humanities. Translated by Mary Catharine Baseheart 
and Marianne Sawicki. Washington: ICS Publications, 2000. p. 227.
211 Ibid., pp. 129-314.
212 Ibid., p. 227.
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“ concretised by meaning, not matter, which means that several individuals can share the same 
spirituality, and also that spirit can be investigated as such in whatever incarnates it, in 
particular in anything produced by humans, such as literature, history or art” .213
Stein also accounts for freedom of the will in her account o f causality and motivation 
in the mental sphere -  causality shows in our life-feelings214, in the changing amounts 
of vitality and sluggishness that a person experiences and as such they are determined
• 9 T Sand necessary; motivation on the other hand is not determined, it describes the 
meaning we individually attach to any set of circumstances. As in the case of 
Thomas’s liberum arbitrium a person may be directed in a certain direction but 
simply choose to go against it -  when presented with a state o f affairs which “defines 
a range of possibilities, and if  the knowing subject departs from this range, it proceeds 
irrationally.”216
In both treatises Thomas emphasises the unity of body and soul. As human beings we 
are governed by both mind and body and individually we have a responsibility to be 
true to ourselves and to strive to become the best that we can be in this our earthly 
existence. The assumption that everyone has a goal in life is so basic to our nature that 
we pass most o f our days unaware o f its importance to our well-being and happiness. 
But a goal, doing something because we believe it is intrinsically good in itself and 
desired by us as such, gives us a perspective and forces us to reflect on what is 
important and meaningful to us and, although we may not think in terms of an
213 Lebech, M. Study Guide to Edith Stein’s Philosophy o f Psychology and the Humanities. 
MA.Degree Seminar 2004.
214 “Not only the quality but also the ‘strength’ o f the effect depends on the origin, except that the 
strength here isn’t measurable as in the area o f physical nature” . Stein, p. 15.
215 “Motivation, in our general sense, is the connection that acts get into with one another: not a mere 
blending like that o f  simultaneously or sequentially ebbing phases o f  experiences, or the associative 
tying together o f experiences, but an emerging o f the one out o f  the other, a self fulfilling or being 
fulfilled of the one on the basis o /the  other, fo r  the sake o f  the other”. Stein, p. 41.
216 Ibid., p. 44.
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ultimate goal in a theological sense nevertheless every step we take to reach our 
human potential will ultimately lead us to completeness.
Thomas’s discussion on freedom of choice speaks volumes today in a world that 
offers far greater choice in the moral sense as much as it does in every other sphere o f 
our lives. The challenge for us today is in learning how to exercise those choices in 
order to produce a system that accepts changing values, one that develops a language 
that invites discussion at every level and one that is open to the deep and searching 
questions of our times, while at the same time maintaining the overall common good 
as its foundation. Thomas’s legacy to us is his insight into philosophy and theology; 
his life o f dedication and commitment may stand in stark contrast to the affluent 
wealth and pleasures we enjoy today and yet it serves as a reminder to us all that no 
matter how vastly different our worlds or cultures may be the questions surrounding 
our human existence remain the same. His insights into human nature force us to 
reflect also on how man over time has always been and will always be subject to 
temptations such as greed for wealth and power and yet has it not always been in 
man’s nature to yearn for something higher? Belief in the afterlife may be crucial to 
Thomas’s account yet even the sceptic can appreciate that it is only by reflecting on 
the big issues such as human nature and the meaning and goal o f our lives that we can 
begin to open our hearts and minds to the diverse and changing views of others. It is 
this search for truth that lies behind Thomas’ writing, a search that influenced many 
successive generations in the process o f finding new ways to understanding man and 
his Creator. Thomas initiated what we today would describe as a holistic view of man 
and his place in the universe. In both treatises he highlights the uniqueness o f the 
individual but equally he stresses our relationships with others and above all with our
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Creator. And although we need to place much o f his writing in the context of its time 
the synthesis he sought to establish between philosophy and theology has remained 
relevant to us today. In addition we are currently witnessing a greater openness and 
receptivity between religion and the sciences in which each realises not only their 
respective limitations but also the strengths and values o f the other. In this way 
philosophy, theology and science can meet and complement and enrich each other. 
Finally the sheer size of the output o f Thomas’s work is testament to his genius, his 
methodical questioning, his searching and inquiring nature represent a timeless 
challenge to us all, believer and non-believer alike, for Thomas “contemplation was a 
journey, and research a quest for truth.”217
Thomas’s treatment o f human nature and his belief that man’s ultimate end is the life 
of the spirit provide a real starting point for a discussion on how we can begin to take 
a fresh look at a system which lays a foundation for the moral judgement o f human 
acts and which is also the meeting place o f human wisdom and divine truth.
217 O ’Meara, p. 215.
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